Erstellt von Legija, 27.01.2006, 11:54 Uhr · 222 Antworten · 9.602 Aufrufe
Jep, es giebt sogar eine graphische Darstellung davon, "Revolution", was sich daraus bildet und welche Gruppen mit welchen Eigenschaften, bin gerade am suchen.
Während der Revolution giebt es imer gruppierungen die andere vorstellungen haben und auch nach der Revolution, ein Bsp. ist der Machtkampf der danach entsteht.
haha nur zu blöd das die Vereinten Nationen die UCK als Terrororganisation deklariert hat. Sind eigentlich Avatare dieses Terroristischen Abschaums der UCK hier erlaubt ??
Zitat von albaner
BTW : Du pauschalisierst und bezeichnest ein ganzes Volk als Nazis, denke eine Verwarnung wäre hier das mindeste, ich plädiere für die sperrung dieses Users Albaner
elendiger lügner, du hast pauschalisiert . ausserdem ist die UCK nach dem krieg als Terrororganisation deklariert worden
Zitat von albaner
warum lügner ? in der TMK sind die meisten ehemalige uck kämpfer , in der politik sind auch welche. ne ne ne ne ne ne serbe , so nicht , nach dem krieg wurde die uck nicht terrororganisation genannt , wenn heute die uck genannt wird , wird nie was von terroristen erwähnt , freiheitskämpfer ja oder es wird gesagt ,die uck die für die rechte der albaner kämpfte aber ni 8) eeeeeee wird was von terrororganisation gesagt. 8)
Zitat von Venom
Die UCK wurde als Terrororganisation proklamiert ! Wann ? 1998
Zitat von albaner
A pattern of aggression
Iraq was not the first illegal US-led attack on a sovereign state in recent times. The precedent was set in 1999 in Yugoslavia writes Kate Hudson
Thursday August 14, 2003
The legality of the war against Iraq remains the focus of intense debate - as is the challenge it poses to the post-second-world-war order, based on the inviolability of sovereign states. That challenge, however, is not a new one. The precursor is without doubt Nato's 1999 attack on Yugoslavia, also carried out without UN support. Look again at how the US and its allies behaved then, and the pattern is unmistakable.
Yugoslavia was a sovereign state with internationally recognised borders; an unsolicited intervention in its internal affairs was excluded by international law. The US-led onslaught was therefore justified as a humanitarian war - a concept that most international lawyers regarded as having no legal standing (the Commons foreign affairs select committee described it as of "dubious legality"). The attack was also outside Nato's own remit as a defensive organisation - its mission statement was later rewritten to allow for such actions.
In Yugoslavia, as in Iraq, the ultimate goal of the aggressor nations was regime change. In Iraq, the justification for aggression was the possession of weapons of mass destruction; in Yugoslavia, it was the prevention of a humanitarian crisis and genocide in Kosovo. In both cases, the evidence for such accusations has been lacking: but while this is now widely accepted in relation to Iraq, the same is not true of Yugoslavia.
In retrospect, it has become ever clearer that the justification for war was the result of a calculated provocation - and manipulation of the legitimate grievances of the Kosovan Albanians - in an already tense situation within the Yugoslav republic of Serbia. The constitutional status of Kosovo had been long contested and the case for greater Kosovan Albanian self-government had been peacefully championed by the Kosovan politician, Ibrahim Rugova.
In 1996, however, the marginal secessionist group, the Kosovo Liberation Army, stepped up its violent campaign for Kosovan independence and launched a series of assassinations of policemen and civilians in Kosovo, targeting not only Serbs, but also Albanians who did not support the KLA. The Yugoslav government branded the KLA a terrorist organisation - a description also used by US officials. As late as the beginning of 1998, Robert Gelbard, US special envoy to Bosnia, declared: "The UCK (KLA) is without any question a terrorist group."
KLA attacks drew an increasingly heavy military response from Yugoslav government forces and in the summer of 1998 a concerted offensive against KLA strongholds began. In contrast to its earlier position, the US administration now threatened to bomb Yugoslavia unless the government withdrew its forces from the province, verified by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The US was now clearly determined to remove Milosevic, who was obstructing Yugoslavia's integration into the western institutional and economic framework.
Agreement was reached in October 1998 and 1,000 OSCE observers went to Kosovo to oversee the withdrawal of government troops. But the KLA used the pullback to renew armed attacks. In January 1999 an alleged massacre of 45 Kosovan Albanians by Yugoslav government forces took place at Racak. Both at the time and subsequently, evidence has been contradictory and fiercely contested as to whether the Racak victims were civilians or KLA fighters and whether they died in a firefight or close-range shootings.
Nevertheless, Racak was seized on by the US to justify acceleration towards war. In early 1999, the OSCE reported that "the current security environment in Kosovo is characterised by the disproportionate use of force by the Yugoslav authorities in response to persistent attacks and provocations by the Kosovan Albanian paramilitaries." But when the Rambouillet talks convened in February 1999, the KLA was accorded the status of national leader. The Rambouillet text, proposed by the then US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, included a wide range of freedoms and immunities for Nato forces within Yugoslavia that amounted to an effective occupation. Even the former US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, described it as "a provocation, an excuse to start bombing". The Yugoslavs refused to sign, so bombing began on March 24 1999.
Despite claims by western leaders that Yugoslav forces were conducting "genocide" against the Kosovan Albanians, reports of mass killings and atrocities - such as the supposed concealment of 700 murdered Kosovan Albanians in the Trepca mines - were often later admitted to be wrong. Atrocities certainly were carried out by both Serb and KLA forces. But investigative teams did not find evidence of the scale of dead or missing claimed at the time, responsibility for which was attributed to the Yugoslavs. The damage inflicted by US and British bombing, meanwhile, was considerable, including civilian casualties estimated at between 1,000 and 5,000 deaths. Nato forces also used depleted uranium weapons - linked to cancers and birth defects - while Nato bombers destroyed swathes of Serbia's economic and social infrastructure.
Far from solving a humanitarian crisis, the 79-day bombardment triggered the flight of hundreds of thousands of Kosovans. Half a million Kosovan Albanians who had supposedly been internally displaced turned out not to have been, and of the 800,000 who had sought refuge or been forced into neighbouring countries, the UNHCR estimated that 765,000 had already returned to Kosovo by August of the same year. A more long-lasting result, however, was that half the Kosovan Serb population - approximately 100,000 - left Kosovo or was driven out.
So was the war worth it? Notwithstanding the Nato-UN protectorate established in Kosovo, the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was no longer under threat - the Kosovans did not achieve their independence. Nor has western support for the KLA been mirrored in Kosovan voting patterns: the party of Rugova, who never backed the violent path, received a convincing majority in the elections in 2001.
Meanwhile, violence dogs the surviving minority communities, and in spite of the presence of 40,000 K-For troops and a UN police force, the Serb and other minorities (such as Roma) have continued to be forced out. More than 200,000 are now estimated to have left. In the short term, support for Milosevic actually increased as a result of the war, and the regime was only changed through a combination of economic sanctions, elections and heavy western intervention. Such interference in a country's internal politics does not generally lead to a stable and peaceful society, as evidenced by the recent assassination of Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic, the most pro-western politician in the country.
As in Yugoslavia, so in Iraq: illegal aggression justified by spin and fabrication enables might to prevail and deals a terrible blow to the framework of international law. As in Yugoslavia, so in Iraq, people's wellbeing comes a poor second-best to the interests of the world's self-appointed moral and economic arbiters.
·Kate Hudson is principal lecturer in Russian and East European politics at South Bank University, London and author of Breaking the South Slav Dream: the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia
Source: The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/st...018258,00.html
Zitat von Venom
wie gesagt anfangs wurden die als terroristen gesehen , später nicht mher , die wurden untesrützt.
Das Ende des Kalten Krieges brachte zahlreiche Kürzungen auf Seiten der amerikanischen Streitkräfte mit sich. So wurde ab dem 15. Juli 1991 die 10th SFG aus dem bayrischen Bad Tölz abgezogen und in die Staaten rückversetzt.
Doch die Weltlage änderte sich nicht nur zum Guten und so befanden sich Special Forces kurz darauf auch schon wieder auf Ausbildungsmissionen in Somalia (1993) und Haiti (1994). Kurz nachdem sich die NATO entschlossen hatte in Bosnien zu intervenieren, befanden sich Green Berets der 10th SFG im Land.Weitere Ausbildungs- und Kampfeinsätze weltweit folgten, darunter auch im Kosovo 1999. Hier waren die Special Forces vor allem mit Fernspäh- und FAC-Missionen, aber auch mit Beratungstätigkeiten für die albanische UCK im Einsatz.
Die Ausbildung durch die albanische Armee begann im Jahre 1996. Von 1998 an trainierten Ausbilder der privaten US-Firma Military Professional Resources Incorporated sowie Mitglieder britischer und deutscher privater Sicherheitsfirmen die UCK. Zwischen 1998 und Juli 1999 wurden UCK-Mitglieder in Italien, der Türkei, Deutschland und dem Kosovo unterstützt beziehungsweise ausgebildet. In den Trainingscamps in Albanien waren während des Kosovokrieges inoffiziell deutsche und britische Ausbilder tätig.
CIA-Berater halfen der UÇK spätestens seit 1999 mit militärischen Handbüchern zur Ausbildung und Ratschlägen zur Bekämpfung serbischer Polizei- und Armeeeeinheiten. Es ist unklar, ab wann genau solche Unterstützung gewährt wurde.
ja ja terroristen werden von amis , engländern , deutschen , italienern , türken usw.. ausgebildet , in der politk dürfen die auch sein oder in einer schutztruppe die später zur armee wird
idiotttttttt , habe ich alles schon vorher gesagt aber ich muss es immer wiederholen damit es auch mal dein serbisches erbsenhirn checkt
die Taliban, die mudzahedin, Al Kaida und der rest von diesem Islamofaschistischen dreck, alle wurden sie von den USA unterstützt aber heute sind sie komischerweise alle Totfeinde der Amerikaner..was für eine Ironie meinst du nicht ?
Bin Laden and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
The role of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as a terrorist organization is amply documented by Congressional transcripts. According to Frank Ciluffo of the Globalized Organized Crime Program, in a testimony presented to the House of Representatives Judicial Committee:
"What was largely hidden from public view was the fact that the KLA raise part of their funds from the sale of narcotics. Albania and Kosovo lie at the heart of the "Balkan Route" that links the "Golden Crescent" of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the drug markets of Europe. This route is worth an estimated $400 billion a year and handles 80 percent of heroin destined for Europe." (House Judiciary Committee, 13 December 2000)
The relationship between the KLA and Osama bin Laden is confirmed by Interpol's Criminal Intelligence division:
"The U.S. State Department listed the KLA as a terrorist organization, indicating that it was financing its operations with money from the international heroin trade and loans from Islamic countries and individuals, among them allegedly Usama bin Laden . Another link to bin Laden is the fact that the brother of a leader in an Egyptian Jihad organization and also a military commander of Usama bin Laden, was leading an elite KLA unit during the Kosovo conflict." (US Congress, Testimony of Ralf Mutschke of Interpol's Criminal Intelligence Division, to the House Judicial Committee, 13 December 2000).
The evidence regarding the KLA contained in Congressional transcripts, news reports and intelligence documents directly implicates General Wesley Clark.
During his stint as NATO Supreme commander (1997-2000). Clark had close personal ties with KLA Chief of Staff Commander Brigadier Agim Ceku and KLA Leader Hashim Thaci (see photo below ).
Agim Ceku, who directly collaborated with NATO during the 1999 Kosovo campaign is recognized by the Hague ICTY Tribunal "for alleged war crimes committed against ethnic Serbs in Croatia between 1993 and 1995." ( AFP 13 Oct 1999)
Hashim Thaci had ordered the political assassination of his opponents in Ibrahim Rugova's nationalist Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) (See November 2000 BBC Report at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1037302.stm ). According to The Boston Globe (2 August 1999):
"Terrorists with ties to Osama bin Laden running around with AK-47s and anti-tank weapons is bad enough. Worse, Thaci's boys aren't just killers and kleptos, but mafioso who are neck deep in the drug trade. (During the war, the Washington Times quoted an unnamed U.S. drug enforcement official commenting on the KLA, 'They were drug dealers in 1998 and now, because of politics, they're freedom fighters.')"
In the wake of the 1999 Kosovo campaign, under NATO regency, these acts of political assassination--ordered by the self-proclaimed Provisional Government of Kosovo (PGK)-- were carried out in a totally permissive environment. The leaders of the KLA, rather than being arrested by NATO for war crimes, were granted KFOR protection. According to one report of the Foreign Policy Institute (published during the 1999 bombings): "...the KLA have [no] qualms about murdering Rugova's collaborators, whom it accused of the "crime" of moderation...(Michael Radu, "Don't Arm the KLA", CNS Commentary from the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 7 April, 1999).
In course of the bombing campaign, Fehmi Agani, one of Rugova's closest collaborators in the Kosovo Democratic League (KDL) was executed on the orders of the r Hashim Thaci.(Tanjug Press Dispatch, 14 May 1999): "If Thaci actually considered Rugova a threat, he would not hesitate to have Rugova removed from the Kosovo political landscape." (Stratfor Comment, "Rugova Faced with a Choice of Two Losses", Stratfor, 29 July 1999). In turn, the KLA has abducted and killed numerous professionals and intellectuals.
And who were behind the 29 year old KLA leader Hashim Thaci? Madeleine Albright and Wesley Clark. (see photos below ).
NATO, the KLA and Al Qaeda
According to a US Department of Defense briefing, so-called "initial contacts" between the KLA and NATO took place in mid-1998, during the first part of General Clark's mandate as NATO Commander in Chief:
"...the realization has come to people [in NATO] that we [NATO led by Wesley Clark] have to have the UCK [acronym for KLA in Albanian] involved in this process because they have shown at least the potential to be rejectionists of any deal that could be worked out there with the existing Kosovo parties. So somehow they have to be brought in and that's why we've made some initial contacts there with the group, hopefully the right people in the group, to try and bring them into this negotiating process." (US Department of Defense, Background Briefing, July 15, 1998)
["Hopefully the right group" means "we deal with people who obey orders."]
While these "initial contacts" were acknowledged by NATO officially only in mid-1998, the KLA had (according to several reports) been receiving "covert support" and training from the CIA and Germany's intelligence agency the Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND) since the mid-nineties. These covert operations were known and approved by NATO. (Michel Chossudovsky, Kosovo `Freedom Fighters' Financed by Organised Crime, Covert Action Quarterly, 2000)
The development and training of KLA forces was part of NATO planning, directly led by General Wesley Clark. In the words of former Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) secret agent Michael Levine, writing at the height of the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia:
"Ten years ago we were arming and equipping the worst elements of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan - drug traffickers, arms smugglers, anti-American terrorists…Now we're doing the same thing with the KLA, which is tied in with every known middle and far eastern drug cartel. Interpol, Europol, and nearly every European intelligence and counter-narcotics agency has files open on drug syndicates that lead right to the KLA, and right to Albanian gangs in this country." (New American Magazine, May 24, 1999)
The KLA acted as a paramilitary force, present on the ground in Kosovo. It was integrated by US and British SAS Special Forces and remained in close liaison with NATO. The KLA was also used by NATO High Command to acquire intelligence on bombing targets during the 1999 Kosovo campaign.
Confirmed by British military sources, the task of arming and training of the KLA had been entrusted in 1998 to the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Britain's Secret Intelligence Services MI6, together with "former and serving members of 22 SAS [Britain's 22nd Special Air Services Regiment], as well as three British and American private security companies". (The Scotsman, Glasgow, 29 August 1999)
"The US DIA approached MI6 to arrange a training program for the KLA, said a senior British military source. `MI6 then sub-contracted the operation to two British security companies, who in turn approached a number of former members of the (22 SAS) regiment. Lists were then drawn up of weapons and equipment needed by the KLA.' While these covert operations were continuing, serving members of 22 SAS Regiment, mostly from the unit's D Squadron, were first deployed in Kosovo before the beginning of the bombing campaign in March ." (Ibid)
While British SAS Special Forces in bases in Northern Albania were training the KLA, military instructors from Turkey and Afghanistan financed by the "Islamic jihad" were providing the KLA with guerilla and diversion tactics:
"Bin Laden had visited Albania himself. He was one of several fundamentalist groups that had sent units to fight in Kosovo, ... Bin Laden is believed to have established an operation in Albania in 1994 ... Albanian sources say Sali Berisha, who was then president, had links with some groups that later proved to be extreme fundamentalists." (Sunday Times, London, 29 November 1998.)
In the Wake of the 1999 Bombing of Yugoslavia
In the wake of the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia, NATO under Wesley Clark's command, supported the extension of the terrorist activities of the KLA into Southern Serbia and Macedonia.
Meanwhile, the KLA --renamed the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)-- was elevated to United Nations status, implying the granting of "legitimate" sources of funding through United Nations as well as through bilateral channels, including direct US military aid.
In other words, a terrorist paramilitary force supported by Al Qaeda and linked to organized crime becomes a legitimate "civilian" National Guard, directly supported by NATO and the UN.
And barely two months after the official inauguration of the KPC under UN auspices (September 1999), KPC-KLA commanders - using UN resources and equipment - were already preparing the assaults into Macedonia, as a logical follow-up to their terrorist activities in Kosovo. In this endeavour they had the full support of NATO and the US military, not to mention the so-called "international community" symbolised by the UN Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK), headed by France's former Minister of Health Bernard Kouchner:
According to the Skopje daily Dnevnik, the KPC had established a "sixth operation zone" in Southern Serbia and Macedonia:
"Sources, who insist on anonymity, claim that the headquarters of the Kosovo protection brigades [i.e. linked to the UN sponsored KPC] have [March 2000] already been formed in Tetovo, Gostivar and Skopje. They are being prepared in Debar and Struga [on the border with Albania] as well, and their members have defined codes." (Macedonian Information Centre Newsletter, Skopje, 21 March 2000, published by BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 24 March 2000)
According to the BBC, "Western special forces were still training the guerrillas" meaning that they were assisting the KLA in opening up "a sixth operation zone" in Southern Serbia and Macedonia. (BBC, 29 January 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/wor...00/1142478.stm )
Ironically the United Nations in a confidential February 2000 report to Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that the KPC, was responsible for "criminal activities . . . killings, ill-treatment (and) torture, illegal policing, abuse of authority, intimidation, breaches of political neutrality and hate-speech.". These occurred at the height of Bernard Kouchner's "humanitarian" mandate as the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (15 July 1999 to 12 January 2001).
And in this regard, Kouchner, whose mandate was to channel humanitarian aid under UN auspices, worked closely with NATO officials including Wesley Clark in providing support to Kosovo's terrorist paramilitary army. (See photo below ). Let us not forget that Bernard Kouchner was the Founder of "Doctors without Borders".(Médecins sans frontières)
According to the London Observer, "the grim message to the U.N. secretary-general is that his own organization [led by UNMIK Head Bernard Kouchner] is paying the salaries of many of the offenders" (Observer, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/031400-03.htm , 14 March 2000)
Wer zuletzt lacht, lacht am besten
Zitat von albaner
die uck war klar als terroroganisation deklariert.
- genau bis 1998.
- 1999 handlanger der nato (hast du übrigens richtig beschrieben)
- nach dem ende der bombardierung hatte es die nato ganz eilig die bezeichnung uck loszuwerden.
ja weshalb wohl, wo sie ja offiziell ja gar keine terrororganistion mehr war?
ich weiss, überlegen ist für albaner sehr anspruchsvoll, aber vielleicht versuchst du es trotzdem mal
versuch mal zu erklären, warum die nato dein friedliches land bombardiert hat.
vielleicht war dein land ein terorrstaat?!