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Die Kolonisierung des Kosovo 1918-1941

Erstellt von Gentos, 17.11.2010, 13:23 Uhr · 113 Antworten · 7.208 Aufrufe

  1. #101
    Avatar von Mbreti Bardhyl

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    Expulsion of the Albanians – V. Cubrilovic, 1937



    DR. V. CUBRILOVIC


    THE EXPULSION
    OF THE
    ALBANIANS


    Memorandum presented
    on March 7, 1937
    in Belgrade


    THE EXPULSION OF THE ALBANIANS
    The problem of the Albanians in our national and state life did not arise yesterday. It played a major role on our life in the Middle Ages, but its importance became decisive by the end of the 17th century, at the time when the masses of the Serbian people were displaced northwards from their former ancestral territories of Raska and were supplanted by the Albanian Highlanders. Gradually the latter came down their mountains to a fertile plains of Metohija and Kosovo. Penetrating to the north, they spread in the direction of Southern and Western Morava and, cross-sections of the Vardar. In this war, by the 19th century the Albanian triangle was formed, a wedge which abased on its Debar-Rogozna axis in its ethnic rear, penetrated as far into our territories as Nis and separated our ancient territories of Raska from Macedonia and the Vardar Valley.
    This Albanian wedge inhabited by the anarchist Albanian element hampered any strong cultural, educational and economic connection between our northern and southern territories in the 19th century. This was the main reason why Serbia was unstable, until 1878 when it managed to establish and maintain continuos links with Macedonia, through Vranje and the Black Mountain of Skopje, to exercise the cultural and political influence on the Vardar Valley that was anticipated because of the favorable geographical and road links and the Historical traditions on those regions. Although the Bulgarians began their state life after the Serbs, at first they had greater success. This explains why there are permanent settlements of southern Slavs from Vidin in the north to Ohrid in the South. Serbia began to cut out pieces off this Albanian wedge as early as the first uprising, by expelling the northernmost Albanian inhabitants from Jagodina.
    Thanks to the broad state concepts of Jovan Ristic, Serbia cut another piece off this wedge after the annexation of Toplica and Kosanica. At that time, the regions between Jastrebac and Southern Morava were radicaly cleared of the Albanians.
    From 1918 onwards it was the task of our present state to destroy the remainder of the Albanian triangle. It did not do this. There are several reasons for this, but we shall mention only the most important of them:
    1. The fundamental mistake of the authorities in charge at that time ins that, forgetting where they were, they wanted to solve all the major ethnic problems of the troubled and bleeding Balkans by western methods. Turkey brought to the Balkans the customs of Sheriat, according to which victory in War and the occupation of a country confers the right to the lives of subject inhabitants. Even the Balkan Christians learned from the Turks that not only the state power and domination, but also home and property are won and lost by the sword. The concept of the relations of private ownership of the land n the Balkans was to be softened to some extent through laws, ordinances and other international agreements issued under pressure from Europe, but this concept has been to some degree the main lever of the Turkish state and the Balkan states right to do this. We shall mention only few cases if recent rimes. The removal of Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and of Turks from Greece to Asia Minor, the recent removal of Turks from Bulgaria and Romania to Turkey. While all the Balkan states since 1912 have solved or are on the way of solving the problems of all minorities through mass removals, we have stuck to slow and sluggish methods of gradual colonization. The results of this have been negative. That this is so us best shown by the statistics from the 18 districts which compromise of the Albanian triangle. From these figures it emerges that in those regions the natural growth plus new settlers (from 1921 to 1931 Albanian population increased by 68.060 while the Serbs show an increase of 58.745 – a difference of 9,315 in favor of Albanians). Taking into account the intractable character of the Albanians, the pronounced increase in their numbers and the ever-increasing difficulties of the colonization by the old methods, with the passage of time this disproportion will become even greater and eventually put in question even those few successes we have achieved in our colonization from 1918 onwards.
    2. Even the method of gradual colonization was not properly applied. Worse still, in a problem of such importance, there was no definite plan of such importance, there was no definite state plan which every government and regime would have to adhere to and implement. Work was intermittent, in first and starts, each new minister undid what his predecessors had done, while himself created nothing solid. The laws and regulations were amended, but even weak as they were, were not implemented. Some people, deputies especially from other regions, when they could not manage to secure the mandate in their own regions, would go to the south and butter-up non-national elements to gain the mandate, thus sacrificing the major national and state interests. The colonization apparatus was extremely costly and inflated loaded with people were not only incompetent but also frequently without scruple, so that their work truly constitutes a separate problem. Finally one need only total up the huge sums this state has invested in colonization and divide them by the number of families settled, to prove how costly every new household established since the war has been, regardless of whether or not this expenditure was met by the settlers themselves or by the state. Likewise, it would be interesting to compare the amounts paid out by personal expenditure and those for the materials used for our colonization. Serbia went about this question quiet differently in the past. Karageorge during his first uprising, as well as Milos, Mihajlo and Jovan Ristic had no special ministry of land reform, general land inspectors, or costly apparatus, and stil purged Serbia of the foreign elements, populating it with its own people, who felled the endless forests of Sumadia, which was transformed from its rough state into the fertile Sumadia of today.
    3. Even those few thousand families that were settled after the war did not establish themselves where they were placed, There was more success in Kosovo, especially in the Lab Valley, where the Toplicans penetratedof their own accord, from north to south. Our oldest and most stable settlements, with elements from our different regions, were established there. In Drenica and Metohija we had no success. Colonization should never be done with Montenegrins alone. We do not think that they are unsuitable as colonists, because of their pastoral indolence. This applies only to the first generation. The second generation is quite different, more active and practical. Petrovo village in Miroc, above the Danube, the most advanced village of Kraijina is inhabited exclusively by Montenegrins. In Serbia today there are thousands of advanced economies, especially in Toplica and Kosanica which have been established by Montenegrins of the first generation, who have mixed with more advanced elements. This is especially valid for the old costumes managed to survive. A visit to the coffee-houses of Pec is sufficient to convince one of this. This is why our colonization has had so little success all over Metohija. It must be admitted, on the other hand, that these colonies have been poorly situated on unfertile scrub-covered land, and almost totally lacking in the most essential agricultural implements. But these should have been given more assistance than the others, because they are made up of the poorest Montenegrin elements.
    4. Without doubt, the main cause for the lack of our colonization in those regions was that in those regions was to take the land from the Albanians. The only possible way for our mass colonization of those regions was to take the land from the Albanians. After the war, at the time of the rebellion and actions of the insurgents, this could have been achieved easily by expelling part of Albanian population to Albania, by not legalizing their usurpation and by buying their pastures. Here we must return again to the gross error of our post-war concept. About the right to possession of the land they had usurped – scarcely any of them had title-deeds issued by the Turks, and those only for land purchased, to the determent of our nation and state, we not only legalized all these unsurpations, but worse still, accustomed the Albanians to West-European ideas about private property. Prior to that, they could have never have had these ideas. In this way, we ourselves handed them a weapon to defend themselves, to keep the best land for themselves and make the nationalization of one of the regions most important to us impossible.
    From all this it is apparent that the methods of our colonization policy in the south to date have not yielded the results which we ought to have achieved and which now impose themselves on us as a major state necessity. We have not criticized these methods merely for the sake of criticism , but so that on the basis of the experience, we can find the right ways to solve this problem.

    THE PROBLEM OF THE COLONIZATION OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONS
    Reading the first part of this paper, one immediately observes that, in examining the problem of colonization of the southern regions, the issue is mainly about the regions to the north and south of the Sar Mountain. This is not accidental. This is not accidental. This block of Albanians around the Sar Mountain has great national, state and strategic importance for our state. We have already mentioned the way it came into existence and the importance of this region for linking the regions around the Vardar Valley firmly with our ancient territories. The greatest force of the Serbian expansion ever since the beginnings of the first Serb State in the 9th century has always been based on the continuity of this expansion, as well as on the expansion of the ancient territories of Raska in all directions, hence including the expansion towards the south. This continuity has been interrupted by the Albanians and, until the ancient uninterrupted connection of Serbia and Montenegro with Macedonia along the whole of its extent from the Drin River to Southern Morava is reestablished we will not be secure in our possession of this territory. From the ethnic standpoint the Macedonians will fully unite with us only when they enjoy true ethnic support from Serbian motherland, which they have lacked to this day. This they will achieve only through the destruction of the Albanian block.
    From the military-strategic standpoint, the Albanian block occupies one of the most important positions of our country – the starting point from which the Balkan Rivers flow to the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea and the Agean Sea. The holding of this strategic positions, to a large degree, determines the fate of the Central Balkans, especially the fate of the main Balkan communication line from Morave to Vardar. It is no accident that many battles of decisive importance for the destiny of the Balkans (Nemanja against the Greeks the Serbs against the Turks in 1389, Hanyadj against the Turks 1446) have been fought here. In the 20th century, only that country that is inhabited by its own people can be sure of its security; therefore it is an imperative duty for all of us that we should not allow these positions of such strategic importance to be in the hands of the hostile and alien element. The more so since this element has the support of the national state of the same race. Today this state is powerless but even in this condition, it has become a base of Italian imperialism, which aims to use it to penetrate into the heart of oru state. Our elements will be willing and able to defend its own land and its own state, is the most reliable means we have against this penetration.
    Besides this block of 18 districts, the Albanians and other national minorities in the other parts of the southern regions are dispersed and therefore, not so dangerous to our national and state life. To nationalize the regions around the Sar Mountain means to bury any irredentism forever.
    The colonization from the north should be reduced in the regions inhabited by Macedonians. In these regions land is scarce, they are passive regions and, for this reason, the Macedonians resist the flow of settlers from the north, the more so because in these actions they see our distrust towards them. The truth is that even that small degree of colonization does us more harm than good. If people are to be sent down there south of Black Mountain of Skopje, they should be people from Vranje, Leskovac, who are closer to the Macedonians in mentality and culture and by no means the people from the Dynaric regions with their irritable uncontrolled temperament because such elements arouse the hatred of the local people. We repeat that this problem will be solved only when our colonies, advancing from the north through Kosovo and Metohija, towards the Sar Mountain, Polog meet the Macedonian settlements.
    The problem of Sandjak of Novi Pazar is solving itself and is no longer playing the role it played in our state life until 1912. We shall only mention that with the removal of the Albanians, the last link between our Moslems in Bosna and Novi Pazar and the rest of the Moslem world is cut. They are becoming religious minorities, the only Moslem minority in the Balkans, and this fact will accelerate their nationalization.
    Recently Montenegro has become a very grave problem. The poor land cannot sustain the population, but despite the removal this increased by 16 per cent from 1912 to 1931. Through the centuries, this turbulent pastoral element has contributed essential features in our race. Channeled in the right direction, their energies will not be destructive, but we can be employed to the general benefit of the state, if they are directed to southeast.
    Summing-up
    The Albanians cannot be repulsed by means of gradual colonization alone; they are the only people who, during the last millennium managed not only to resist the nucleus of our state but also to harm us by pushing our ethnic borders northwards and eastwards. Whereas in the last millennium our ethnic borders were shifted to Subotica in the north and Kupa in Northwest, the Albanians drove us from the Skadar and its region, the former capital city of Bodin, from Metohija and Kosovo. The only way and the only means to cope with them is the brute force of an organized state, in which we have always been superior to them. If since 1912 we have had no success in the struggle against the, we are to blame for this, as we have not used this power as we should have done. It is not possible to speak of any national assimilation of the Albanians in our favor. On the contrary, because they base themselves on Albania, their national awareness is awakened and if we do not settle accounts with them at the proper time, within 20-30 years we shall have to cope with a terrible irridentism, the signs of which are already apparent and which will inevitably put all our southern territories in jeopardy.

    THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF COLONIZATION
    If we proceed from the assumption that the gradual displacement of the Albanians through our gradual colonization is ineffective then we are left with only one course – that of their mass resettlement. In this case we must consider two states – Albania and Turkey.
    With its sparse population, it’s many undrained swamps and uncultivated river valleys Albania would be in position to admit some hundred thousands Albanians from our country. With its large uninhabited and uncultivated territories in Asia Minor and Jurdistan, modern Turkey has almost boundless possibilities for internal colonization. However despite all the efforts of Kamal Ataturk, the Turks have not yet filled the vacuum created as a result of the removal of the Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and some of the Turks to Persia. Hence the greatest possibilities are that the bulk of displaced Albanians might be sent there.
    First, we stress that we should not limit ourselves to diplomatic steps with the Ankara government only, but should employ all means to convince Tirana to accept some of our displaced people. I believe that this will come up against difficulties in Tirana, because Italy will try to hinder this process. However, money plays great role in Tirana. In the talks about this question, the Albanian Government should be informed that we shall stop at nothing to achieve our final solution to this question, while at the same time we should tell them about subsidies for colonization, over which no control will be exercised; eventually, through secret channels, the notables in Tirana may be persuaded by material gain to raise no opposition to this whole business.
    As we have heard, Turkey has agreed to accept some 200.000 of our displaced people initially, on condition that they are Albanians, something which is most advantageous to us. We must comply with this desire of Turkey readily and sign a convention about the resettlement of the Albanian population as soon as possible. In connection with the resettlement of the Albanian population we must study the conventions which Turks has signed recently on these questions with Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria, paying attention to two things: that Turkey should accept the largest contingent, while from the financial aspect it should be given the maximum assistance, especially in the matter of organizing their transportation as quickly as possible. Undoubtedly this problem will give rise to some international concern, which is inevitable in such cases. Over the last hundred years, whenever such actions have taken place in the Balkans, there has always been some power which has protested because such an action did not conform to its interests. In the present instance, Albania and Italy may make some protest. As to Albania, we have already pointed out that attempts should be made to conclude a convention with it over this problem and if we don’t achieve this we should at least secure its silence over the question of removal of the Albanians to Turkey. We repeat that skilful action and money properly used in Tirana may de decisive in this matter. World opinion, especially that financed by Italy will be upset a little. Nevertheless, the world today has grown used to things much worse than this and should not be a cause for concern. At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews and Russia can shift millions of people from one part of the continent to another, the shifting of few hundred thousand Albanians will not lead to the outbreak of a World War. However, those who decide should know what they want and persist in achieving this, regardless of the possible’ international obstacles.
    Italy, no doubt will raise more difficulties, but at present it is extremely occupied with its own problems in connection with Abyssinia and Austria and will not dare go very far in its opposition. To tell the truth, the greatest danger lies in the possibility that our great allies, France and Britain might interfere. They must be given a clear and resolute answer that the security of Morina-Vardar line in their interests, a thing which was confirmed on the last great war, and it will be made more secure, both for them and for us, only when we completely dominate the regions around the Sar mountain and Kosovo from the ethnic aspect.

    THE MODE OF REMOVAL
    As we have already stressed, the mass removal of the Albanians from their triangle is the only effective course for us. To bring about the relocation of a whole population and the first prerequisite is the creation of the suitable psychosis. It can be created in many ways.
    As is known the Moslem masses, in general, are very readily influenced, especially by religion, are superstitious and fanatical. Therefore, first of all we must win over their clergy and men of influence, through money or threats to support the relocation of the Albanians. Agitators to advocate this removal must be found, as quickly as possible, especially from Turkey if it will provide them for us. They must describe the beauties in the new territories in Turkey, the easy and pleasant life there, kindle religious fanaticism and awaken pride in the Turkish state among the masses. Our press can be of colossal by help well they have settled down in the new regions. These descriptions will create necessary predisposition to shift among the mass of Albanians here.
    Another means would be coercion by the state apparatus. The law must be enforced to the letter so as to make staying intolerable for the Albanians: fines, and imprisonment, the ruthless application of all police dispositions, such as on the prohibition of smuggling, cutting forests, damaging agriculture, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labor and any other measure that an experienced police force can contrive. From the Economic aspect: the refusal to recognize the old land deeds, the work with the land register should immediately include public debts, requisitioning of all state and communal pastures, the cancellation of concessions, the withdrawal of permits to exercise a profession, dismissal from the state, private and communal offices etc., will hasten the process of their removal. Heath measures: the brutal application of all the dispositions even in the homes, the pulling down of encircling walls and high edges around the houses, the rigorous application of veterinary measures which will result in impending the sale of livestock in the market etc. also can be applied in an effective and practical way. When it comes to religion the Albanians are very touchy, therefore they must be harassed on this score, too. This can be achieved through ill-treatment of their clergy, the destruction of their clergy, the destruction of their cemeteries, the prohibition of polygamy, and especially the inflexible application of the law compelling girls to attend elementary schools, wherever they are.
    Private initiative, too, can assist greatly in this direction. We should distribute weapons to our colonists, as need be. The old forms of cetnik actions should be organized and secretly assisted. In particular, a tide of Montenegrins should be launched from the mountain pastures in order to create a large-scale conflict with the Albanians in Metohija. This conflict should be prepared by means of our trusted people. It should be encouraged and this can be done more easily since, in fact, Albanians have revolted, while the whole affair should be presented as a conflict between clans and, if need be, ascribed to economic reasons. Finally, local riots can be incited. These will be bloodily suppressed with the most effective means but by the colonists from the Montenegrin clans and the cetniks, rather than by means of the army.
    There remains one more means, which Serbia employed with great practical effect after 1878, that is, by secretly burning down villages and city quarters.

    THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REMOVAL
    From the attached map it is apparent what regions must be cleared. They are: Upper Debar, Lower Polog, Upper Polog, Sar Mountain, Drenica, Pec, Istok, Vucitrin, Stavica, Lab and Kacanik. Among these regions which together compromise the Albanian wedge, the most important for us are: Pec, Dakovica, Prodrimja, Goda, Podgor, Sar, Istok, and Drenica – north of the Sar Mountain as well as the Upper Debar and the two Pologs, in the south, and the Sar Mountain These are border regions which must be cleared of Albanians at any cost. The internal regions such as Kacanik, Gilan, Nerodimje, Gracanica, Lab, Vucirin, etc must be weakened if possible, especially that of Kacanik and Lab, while the others should be gradually and systematically colonized over a period of decades.
    The above-mentioned means should be used in the first place in the border regions, if we wish to clear them of Albanians.
    During the resettlement the following must be kept in mind:
    In the first place, resettlement should begin in the villages and then in towns. Being more compact, the villagers are more dangerous. Then, the mistake of removing only the poor should be avoided: the middle and rich strata make up the backbone of every nation, therefore, they, too must be persecuted and driven out. Lacking the support which their economically independent compatriots have, the poor submit more quickly. This question has great importance, and I emphasize this because one of the main causes for the lack of success of our colonization in the south is that the poor were expelled while the rich remained, thus we were no further forward, because we gained very little land for the settlement of our colonists. During the creation of the psychosis for the resettlement, everything possible must be done to send off whole villages, or at least whole families. The situation that part of the family is shifted while others remain behind, must be prevented at all costs. Our state is not going to spend millions to make life easier for the Albanians, but to get rid of as many of them as possible. For this reason the purchase of the land of the Albanians who shift by those who remain behind must be absolutely prohibited. The shifting of individuals and whole villages must be linked with this question, if they want things made easy for them during the process of the relocation.
    Once they agree to shift, all-round aid should be given them. The administrative procedure should be simplified, their property should be paid for on the spot, travel documents should be issued without the least formality and they should be assisted to get to the nearest railway station; trains should be made available for them, as far as Salonica, and thence they should be immediately shipped to Asia. It is very important, that the journey should be easy, comfortable and cheap. Possibly, the travel by train should be free and they should be assisted with food because whether or not large masses will shift, depends largely on this. The fear of difficulties on the journey will be a major obstacle to their moving. Therefore this must be combated by solving all the problems connected with the journey, quickly and energetically. Particular care must be taken to ensure that they have the fewest possible difficulties over the journey, because simple folk orientate themselves with difficulty, therefore it would be advisable to study the system of workers transport by the big travel agencies and use that. The displaced person must pass from hand to hand without feeling the burden of this movement. Only in this way it is possible to create that flow of displaced Albanians which will empty our south of them.

    POPULATING THE DEPOPULATED REGIONS
    The problems of the establishment of colonies in the depopulated regions is not less important than the removal of the Albanians.
    The first question emerges: Who should be settled there? The most natural thing is to people them with our elements from the passive regions, in the first place Montenegrins are the most appropriate for several reasons, because Metohija, Drenica, and Kosovo are most natural places into which they flow from their impoverished mountains. The increase of population in Montenegro has brought about poverty, which in recent times has given rise to continual socio-political unrest unfavorable to our state power and very dangerous to law and order in the future. Giving them maize and pensions is useless. The only solutions is to send them to the fertile regions of Metohija, Drenica and Kosovo. Then, since they are akin to the Albanians in mentally and temperament, the Montenegrins are the most appropriate as instruments to overcome them. In the first place, they must be used in the regions north of Sar Mountain; however along with them some people from Lican, Krajsnica, Serbia, Cacak, Uzice, and Toplica should be used as colonists. This is necessary in order to create better habits of work and organization among the Montenegrins, to break down their nomadic-group psychology, the spirit of collectivity which characterizes the highlanders, by means of mixing and intermarriage with people from various Dinaric regions; in this way a new type of Montenegrin with a less local but broader, more Serbian outlook, will be formed.
    Suitable conditions should be created for the Southern Serb Emigrants living in the regions south of Sar Mountain so that they can take possession of the fertile lands. They are honest, hardworking people, who will be grateful to this state all their lives if pleasant conditions for life in countryside are created for them. The rural Southern Serbs in general have a right to expect more care and attention than we are giving them today. The colonization of Polog (Upper and Lower) and Debar with these paupers, as well as allocating pastures to them instead of the Albanians, will make them feel that this is their state, and they will know to defend its borders.
    Apart from them, the colonization south of SAR Mountain and the Black mountain of Skopje can be done with Serbs from Vranje, Leskovac, Pirot and Blasenica, especially those from passive mountain villages. We repeat that the Dinarics should not be allowed to extend to the south of the line formed by the Black Mountain of Skopje and the SAR mountain.
    During the colonization of the villages emptied of Albanians, it is essential to avoid bureaucratic delays and petty formalities. The first immediate action is to give the colonists title to the land on which they are settled. One of the main reasons for the lack of success of the colonization so far has been that the colonist has not felt secure on the land on which he was settled, because he did not receive title to it immediately, and thus was exposed to ill-treatment at the hands of unscrupulous clerks and politicians. The peasant feels secure in his possession of land only when he knows that no one can shift him for it. Therefore he can not have unrestricted ownership of this property. Because there are many different people among them, such as village proletarians who have lost their feeling for the land, or herdsmen who have to adopt themselves to agriculture, they must be linked with the land by the force of law. This is because they must begin to love their new regions and home, and if they, themselves, do not succeed in this, at least their children should. For this reason the colonists should be prevented by law from gaining full ownership of the land for not less than 30 years, even though they are given the title immediately. According to our law, in our country the woman does not enjoy the right of inheritance to land. In order to avoid fragmentation of the land into small parcels, women must be excluded from the inheritance to colonized lands, expect in cases when the colonist has no male descendants and plans to bring a bridegroom into the household. The properties which have been given to the colonists up till now have been small. Bearing in mind the extensive methods of farming, the fall of prices for agricultural products, as well as the large families of the colonists, 5-10 hectares of land is insufficient to ensure the conditions for the economic development of the colonists. It is better to settle a region with smaller number colonists with better conditions for development, rather than a large number of rural semi-proletarians. This, too, has been another major cause of our lack of success to date in the colonization of the south and the north.
    Elements so suitable for colonization in such difficult conditions as we have are rare among other peoples. Those few successes we have achieved in the policy of colonization are the result of these colonizing qualities of race. Only our peasant, up against scrubland and ground that had never been worked shifted from one environment to another was capable of surviving in such different circumstances. What wouldn’t he be able to do if the state were to give him the things it has the duty to provide.
    On February 10, 1865 the Government of Prince Mihajlos promulgated the law on the Settlement of Foreigners in Serbia. Under this law, the Serbian Government granted poor colonists from neighboring regions 3 jutra of arable land and 3 jutra of non arable land, a house, a joke of oxen, a cart, two goats, or sheep, a sow, the necessary work tools and 120 grosh in cash. Apart from this, obviously maize for food to last them till the first harvest. One plough was provided for every two families. These fixed and movable assets were given to the colonizers for use without the right to sell them for a term of 15 years. At the end of this term, they became property. For the first 5 years the settlers were exempt from all kinds of state taxes, for 10 years they were exempt from the Universal compulsory military service in the regular army and exempt from service in the people’s militia for 5 years. The response from all sides was such that within a few months all the places were filled and more territory was colonized than we have been able to do in several years since the war. If the state had created these favorable conditions for the colonists after 1918, our situation both in Vojvodina and in Southern Serbia would not be as it is. This is how we must act in the future, if we want success.
    The method of colonization of Toplica and Kosvanica after 1878 when the Albanians were expelled from these regions, is also full of lessons. The method for our colonization of these regions was laid down in the law of January 3, 1880. On February 3 of the same year, the People’s Council approved the law on the amendment of agrarian relations according to the principle the land to the peasants. Without hesitation, Serbia sought its first foreign loan in order to pay Turkey for the lands taken. It did not set up any ministry of agrarian reform or costly apparatus for the problem of colonization, but everything was done in a simple and practical manner. The police organs distributed the land to all those who wanted to till it. People came from Montenegro, Sjenica, Vranie, Kosovo, Pec etc. and 30 years after 1878. Toplica and Kosanica, once Albanian regions of ill-repute, gave Serbia the finest regiment in the wars of 1912-1918, the Iron Second Regiment. In those wars, Toplica and Kosanica paid and repaid, with blood of their sons, those tens of millions of dinars which Serbia had spent for their resettlement.
    Only by following these examples and knowing what is required, sparing neither money nor blood, can our state create a new Toplica in Kosovo and Metohija. Hence, if we want these colonists to remain where they are, they must be assured of acquiring all the means of livelihood within few years. We must ruthlessly prohibit any speculations with the houses and properties of displaced Albanians. The state must reserve for itself the unlimited right to dispose of the fixed and movable assets of the people transferred and must settle its own colonists there immediately after the departure of the Albanians. This must be done, because it will rarely happen that a while village departs at once. The first to be settled in these villages should be the Montenegrins, as arrogant, irascible and merciless people, who will drive the remaining Albanians away with their behavior, and then colonists from other regions can be brought in.
    This paper deals with the problem of the colonization of the Southern Serbia Only. The problem of Vojvodina especially the Hungarian triangle in Backa, Senta-Kula-Backa Topola is not less important to us. To destroy this triangle in Vojvodina is tantamount to destroying the Albanian Block around the SAR Mountain. Following the division of the big estates, there remain tens of thousands of Hungarian farm-hands who today are a great burden on the Serbian and German middle peasant of Vojvodina. Some of these Hungarian and even German farm laborers and small proprietors must be sent to the south, because in Backs, on the border with Hungary, they represent a danger, the more so since the Serbs in Backa comprise only 25 per cent of the population. In Southern Serbia, by defending their properties against Albania, they will become good citizens, who will integrate themselves with our masses and, what is more important, being more progressive and of a higher cultural level than our peasants, they will provide an example of advanced methods of the cultivation of the land. We emphasize in particular that the Serbs of Vojvodina should not be sent to the south for colonization. In Vojvodina there is still land for colonization, therefore, they must be given land there. We stress also, that during the period of 1928-1929 there was a widespread movement among the Hungarians and Germans of Vojvodina to move to Southern Serbia, but not knowing the problems our unclear opinion opposed this movement and nipped it in the bud. Another such attempt in this direction should be impended and our public must be instructed to support the movement of the Hungarians and Germans from Vojvodina, and especially from Back to the South.

    THE COLONIZATION APPARATUS
    Of special importance for the solution of the question under discussion is the existence of an apparatus to direct the whole business. The poor work of the apparatus which has implemented our policy of colonization so far is the reason for the good part of our lack of success to date. To avoid this in the future, a reorganization must be carried out.
    No other question demands such continuity in its implementation as colonization does. We have pointed out that one of the main reasons for the lack of success of our colonization in the north and in the south is the inconsistent work and changing policy with each change of government. If this is to be avoided in the future, the colonization should be entrusted to General Staff. Why? Simply for the reason of defense. Our army is interested in settling our own elements along the borders especially the moste delicate sectors. To this end, it will do its utmost to secure the borders with the firmest possible colonization. The General Staff, as the prime institution for the defense of our National Interests, can contribute a great deal to our whole policy of colonization. The General Staff will know how to protect the implementation of the policy of colonization from private interference by those who want to used it for their personal interests and from any external influence. Another important fact is that it would be easier for the General Staff to convince the responsible bodies of the importance if the issue and make them take effective decisions. The People’s Council will have more faith in it and will grant the necessary credits to it more readily than to others.
    The General Staff would guide all the work through a State Council for colonization. This council would be quiet independent, but directly under the control of the Chief of the General Staff, and would have all the organs of our colonization under its control. Representatives of several interested ministries, the national association, technical and scientific institutions, should be brought into this council.
    The greatest mistake of our colonization policy lay in the fact that the untrained and incompetent bureaucracy had the main say in it, and it dealt with the problems a bit at a time, without going into them thoroughly. Let us only recall the colonization of our
    volunteers from Hungary at Ovce Polje, Kadrifikovo or the emigrants from Istra and Gorica who settled around Demir Kapija. This requeires the close linking of the state power, private initiative and scientific institutions with our colonization policy. Private initiatives can operate operate in many directions. The People’s Defense, the Sokolasas, the Cetnik Association, etc. could undertake actions against the Albanians, in which it is appropriate for the state to be involved. The association of agronomists, doctors, engineers the cooperatives etc. can assist very well through their technical councils to solve many problems which arise during the process of our colonization. The cultural associations, too, such as Prosveta in Sarajevo, Matica Srbska in Novi Sad, the Sv. Sava association in Belgrade etc. also have their tasks in connection with this question.
    Undoubtedly, our higher scientific institutions have begun their former prestige. The main reason for this is that the University and the Academy of Sciences are becoming more and more removed from real life and neglecting the chief task they have in a relatively backward country, such as ours – opening the ways for the application of the scientific achievements of the 20th century. Many billions would have been saved in this country, many mistakes would have been avoided in our state policy, including our colonization policy, had the problems been studies seriously and objectively in advance by our competent scientific workers before they were taken up for solution. Our policy of colonization, likewise, would have acquired a more serious approach, greater continuity and effective application had the opinions of experts and scientific workers been sought in advance. In the first place, the Royal Serbian Academy of Sciences and the University of Belgrade ought to take the initiative to organize thorough scientific study of the whole problem of colonization in our country. This would be possible for many reasons. At the University we have experts on every question connected with colonization in our country. The teachers and academicians at the University are independent workers, less subject to external political influence. They already have good experience in such work and their scientific activity is a guarantee of objectivity. Therefore they should take the initiative to set up the colonization institute, the task of which would be to engage in the study of colonization. The state for its part, should detach from several ministries all the institutions which have been engaged with this problem so far, and create a special institution, “The Colonization Inspection Office”.
    The Colonization Inspection Office would be headed by the Inspector General, appointed by decree on the proposal of the Minster of War, the Chief of General Staff, and the Prime Minister. All the work in the colonization institute and the Colonization Inspection Office would be carried out on orders from and under the supervision of the State Council, while the Inspector General would be answerable to the Chief of the General Staff.
    The Colonization Institute would be divided into the following sections: 1) Organization, 2) Education and Culture, 3) Finance, 4) agriculture, 5) construction, 6) hygiene etc. In agreement with the scientific cultural-educational associations, the sections would study problems of colonization and prepare directives, thus supplying our colonization policy with a solid, scientifically worked out material from which to make decisions. At the head of this institute would be people from the State Council, made up of the representatives of the ministries mentioned, the University, the Academy of Sciences and those of private, national and educational-cultural organizations who would be elected or appointed to this council. In this case care must be taken not to bring people just for honor’s sake, but men who love and are dedicated to this great work.
    The heads and employees of the Institute should be selected through competition. The institute would supply the Colonization Inspection Office with scientifically worked out materials for the implementation of the colonization policy. In cases of differences of opinion between the Colonization Inspection Office and the institute over some fundamental question, the Chief of the General Staff would have the decisive way.
    The Colonization Inspection Office must have its executive organs in the territory, made up of people selected for their enthusiasm and readiness for this work, whether or not they are employed by the state. Therefore they should possible be selected through competition and be appointed upon proposal by the Chief of the General Staff, while as to its work, the Colonization Inspection Office and its organs must avoid the bureaucratic formalities as much as possible, while keeping in mind only one thing – the removal of the Albanians as quickly as possible and the settlement of our colonists.
    The police apparatus will play a very important role in this matter. Therefore it is necessary to select the most energetic and honest officers and send them there. Their transfer should be done with the approval of the Chief of the General Staff, and for such a difficult job they should be paid from secret credits. Stern measures must be taken against any of them who commits the slightest infringement. A special commissar would execute the orders of the state colonization inspector must be appointed for the whole territory of the 18 districts mentioned. Prefects of districts must be given special wide powers for the work and the respective instructions. Our political parties should be told curtly that rivalry between parties in elections is categorically prohibited in those districts, and that any interference by the deputies in favor of Albanians is categorically forbidden.
    The state Institute and the inspection Office for colonization will work out the technical details of organizing the removal of the Albanians and the establishment of our settlers. It would not be bad, perhaps, if another private organization were created besides these two official institutions, which would be based on the existing associations and have the task of assisting the implementation of our colonization policy through private initiative. It would be best if the League of our cultural-educational associations were to undertake this work. It would concern itself with coordinating the work of the private associations with the state policy for colonization and would assist liaison between them and the Colonization Institute.

    FINANCIAL MEANS
    Whenever our colonization policy has been criticized for its lack of success, its defenders have always excused themselves with the inadequate financial means the state has allocated for this work. We do not deny that it is sup op to the point, although it must be admitted that more has been spent in our country on the maintenance of this apparatus and its irrational work than on the colonization itself. Nevertheless, if we the state has not provided as it should, it must be understood that every state to ensure the holding of the insecure national regions, by colonizing these regions with its own national elements, must be included among the primary interests. All other commitments rank inferior to this task and this commitment. For this problem, money can and must be found. We have already mentioned the instance of Toplica and Kosanica and the benefits it had from this. When the small Serbian Kingdom did not hesitate to make great financial sacrifices, indeed did not hesitate, as a free and independent Kingdom, to seek its first loan for colonization, can it be said that our present-day Yugoslavia is unable to do such a thing? It can and must do it, and it is not true that it lacks the means to do it. Let us reckon approximately how much it would cost our state to transplant 200.000 Albanians and establish as great a number of our settlers.
    The resettlement of 40.000 Albanian families – taking an average family as 5 members and an average of 15.000 dinars per each family would cost a total of 600 million dinars. The colonization expenditure for the settling of our 40.000 of our families may reach a total of 200 million dinars. In any case the whole thing will not cost more than 800 million dinars. This is why:
    1. The transplanted Albanians will leave not only the land but also their houses and implements. Thus, not only will the overwhelming majority of our settlers assistance with live stock and food, they will recover themselves economically and become independent. For this reason we emphasize here, too, that private speculations with the possessions left by the Albanians must not be permitted in any way, but the state must take them and give them to the settlers.
    2. During the settling up of the new colonies, military forces should be employed, where required, as was the case with construction of Sremska-Raca and the reconstruction of the villages destroyed in 1931 by the earthquake in the south. To this end, the army should be given the right and possibility a kind of obligatory labor service for public projects, just as Stambolisky in Bulgaria created the Trundova Pronist and Hitler created the Arbeitsdienst, in Germany by calling up reservists or extending the term of the military service. It would be especially good that our trained youth, after their graduation from the University are charged with this task. In this case, by taking part in constructive work in general interest, many of them would become more conscious and look at things more realistically. This can be easily applied by giving priority in entering state employment to those youth who spend a definite period in work for our colonization policy. This would also reduce the unemployment among our young intelligentsia, which is becoming an increasingly difficult social problem in our country.
    3. In the agreement with the specialized organizations and associations, the least costly ways must be sought for clearing land of scrub, irrigation, draining swamps, etc. well as for building houses. Private entrepreneurs should be informed that during their work to secure the necessary materials, the state helps them with reduced customs and railway tariffs, credits and other means, so that for such an important work the state has the right to demand from them supplies of materials at the lowest possible prices. The question of securing the materials should be solved directly through cartels and then, in agreement with them, the state will define both the quantity, quality and the price of the materials without fictitious deals. The state enterprises, the railways and especially forest enterprises such as Sipad etc. should be placed totally at the disposal of the State Council for Colonization.
    4. During the colonization the state may grant the settlers property on credit or for cash. Many of them will buy land in new regions, selling their properties in their birthplaces. From this the state will regain a good part of the money it has laid out. However, we stress that the land must be sold only who provide proof that they will settle it permanently and work it. The land given on credit must not be very dear. The rate of interest must be minimal and the repayment should be deferred for several years to give settler time to establish himself i.e. until he has gained strength from the economic aspect.
    Taking this as a basis, the state can find the means from two sources. The State must undertake all the expenditures for the administration of this work and cover it from its normal income. This it can do by pruning unnecessary expenditure or expenditure from other spheres which are not so immediately urgent. The other possible financial source would be loans, which would be provided by the state banks, alone or jointly with our private capital through a compulsory internal loan. This would be based on securities issued by the state as well as on the contributions of the settlers, when they become independent.
    It might not be a bad idea if financing and purchase of lands were done by the agricultural banks in collaboration with the cooperativist unions, under the direct supervision and on the basis of the directives of the State Council for Colonization. However, it is still early to give any definite opinion on this problem, because the conditions on which Turkey will accept the population displaced from our territories are not known.
    Altogether, a sum of few hundred million dinars is a small expenditure for the state, in comparison with the real benefits it will gain from such a move. By securing our most sensitive point in the south through the settlement of our national elements we have several divisions in case of war. By settling these tens of thousands of families from our passive regions, especially Montenegro, as colonists, the intolerable economic crisis in those regions will be eased, and on the other hand, as a result of the great amount of work that will be opened during the colonization, it will be possible to find employment 10.000 workers, thus giving an impulse to our sluggish economy.
    For such an important national, military, strategic and economic task, it is the duty of the state to sacrifice a few hundred million dinars. At a time when it can spend one billion dinars for the construction of the international highway from Subotica to Caribrod, and possible benefit from which we shall enjoy only in the distant future, it can and must find a few hundred million dinars, which will put us back in possession in the cradle of our state.

    CONCLUSION
    In the view of all that has been said above, it is no accident that in our examination of the question of colonization in the south, we proceed from the view that the only effective method for solving this problem is the mass resettlement of the Albanians. Just as in other countries, gradual colonization has had no success in our country. When the state wants to intervene in favor of its own element, in struggle for the land, it can be successful only if it acts brutally. Otherwise, the native with his roots in his birthplace and acclimatized there, is always stronger than the colonist. In our case, this must be kept especially well in mind, because we have to do it with a rugged, resistant and prolific race, which the late Cvijic describes as the most expansive in the Balkans. From 1870 to 1914 Germany spent billions of marks for the gradual colonization of its eastern regions by purchasing land from the poles, but the fecundity of the Polish mothers defeated German organizations and money. This Poland regained its Pozan in 1918. Our statistics of the 1921-31 period, which we have already mentioned, show that the fecundity of the Albanian women defeated our colonization policy too. From this we must draw a conclusion, and do so quickly while there is still time to correct matters.
    All Europe is in a state of turmoil. We do not know what each day and night may bring. Albanian nationalism is mounting in our territories too. To leave the situation as it is would mean, in case of any world conflict our social revolution, both of which are possible in the near future, to jeopardize all our territories in the south. The purpose of this paper is to aver such a thing.
    D. Vaso Cubrilovic

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    Expulsion of the Albanians – V. Cubrilovic, 1937



    DR. V. CUBRILOVIC


    THE EXPULSION
    OF THE
    ALBANIANS


    Memorandum presented
    on March 7, 1937
    in Belgrade


    THE EXPULSION OF THE ALBANIANS
    The problem of the Albanians in our national and state life did not arise yesterday. It played a major role on our life in the Middle Ages, but its importance became decisive by the end of the 17th century, at the time when the masses of the Serbian people were displaced northwards from their former ancestral territories of Raska and were supplanted by the Albanian Highlanders. Gradually the latter came down their mountains to a fertile plains of Metohija and Kosovo. Penetrating to the north, they spread in the direction of Southern and Western Morava and, cross-sections of the Vardar. In this war, by the 19th century the Albanian triangle was formed, a wedge which abased on its Debar-Rogozna axis in its ethnic rear, penetrated as far into our territories as Nis and separated our ancient territories of Raska from Macedonia and the Vardar Valley.
    This Albanian wedge inhabited by the anarchist Albanian element hampered any strong cultural, educational and economic connection between our northern and southern territories in the 19th century. This was the main reason why Serbia was unstable, until 1878 when it managed to establish and maintain continuos links with Macedonia, through Vranje and the Black Mountain of Skopje, to exercise the cultural and political influence on the Vardar Valley that was anticipated because of the favorable geographical and road links and the Historical traditions on those regions. Although the Bulgarians began their state life after the Serbs, at first they had greater success. This explains why there are permanent settlements of southern Slavs from Vidin in the north to Ohrid in the South. Serbia began to cut out pieces off this Albanian wedge as early as the first uprising, by expelling the northernmost Albanian inhabitants from Jagodina.
    Thanks to the broad state concepts of Jovan Ristic, Serbia cut another piece off this wedge after the annexation of Toplica and Kosanica. At that time, the regions between Jastrebac and Southern Morava were radicaly cleared of the Albanians.
    From 1918 onwards it was the task of our present state to destroy the remainder of the Albanian triangle. It did not do this. There are several reasons for this, but we shall mention only the most important of them:
    1. The fundamental mistake of the authorities in charge at that time ins that, forgetting where they were, they wanted to solve all the major ethnic problems of the troubled and bleeding Balkans by western methods. Turkey brought to the Balkans the customs of Sheriat, according to which victory in War and the occupation of a country confers the right to the lives of subject inhabitants. Even the Balkan Christians learned from the Turks that not only the state power and domination, but also home and property are won and lost by the sword. The concept of the relations of private ownership of the land n the Balkans was to be softened to some extent through laws, ordinances and other international agreements issued under pressure from Europe, but this concept has been to some degree the main lever of the Turkish state and the Balkan states right to do this. We shall mention only few cases if recent rimes. The removal of Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and of Turks from Greece to Asia Minor, the recent removal of Turks from Bulgaria and Romania to Turkey. While all the Balkan states since 1912 have solved or are on the way of solving the problems of all minorities through mass removals, we have stuck to slow and sluggish methods of gradual colonization. The results of this have been negative. That this is so us best shown by the statistics from the 18 districts which compromise of the Albanian triangle. From these figures it emerges that in those regions the natural growth plus new settlers (from 1921 to 1931 Albanian population increased by 68.060 while the Serbs show an increase of 58.745 – a difference of 9,315 in favor of Albanians). Taking into account the intractable character of the Albanians, the pronounced increase in their numbers and the ever-increasing difficulties of the colonization by the old methods, with the passage of time this disproportion will become even greater and eventually put in question even those few successes we have achieved in our colonization from 1918 onwards.
    2. Even the method of gradual colonization was not properly applied. Worse still, in a problem of such importance, there was no definite plan of such importance, there was no definite state plan which every government and regime would have to adhere to and implement. Work was intermittent, in first and starts, each new minister undid what his predecessors had done, while himself created nothing solid. The laws and regulations were amended, but even weak as they were, were not implemented. Some people, deputies especially from other regions, when they could not manage to secure the mandate in their own regions, would go to the south and butter-up non-national elements to gain the mandate, thus sacrificing the major national and state interests. The colonization apparatus was extremely costly and inflated loaded with people were not only incompetent but also frequently without scruple, so that their work truly constitutes a separate problem. Finally one need only total up the huge sums this state has invested in colonization and divide them by the number of families settled, to prove how costly every new household established since the war has been, regardless of whether or not this expenditure was met by the settlers themselves or by the state. Likewise, it would be interesting to compare the amounts paid out by personal expenditure and those for the materials used for our colonization. Serbia went about this question quiet differently in the past. Karageorge during his first uprising, as well as Milos, Mihajlo and Jovan Ristic had no special ministry of land reform, general land inspectors, or costly apparatus, and stil purged Serbia of the foreign elements, populating it with its own people, who felled the endless forests of Sumadia, which was transformed from its rough state into the fertile Sumadia of today.
    3. Even those few thousand families that were settled after the war did not establish themselves where they were placed, There was more success in Kosovo, especially in the Lab Valley, where the Toplicans penetratedof their own accord, from north to south. Our oldest and most stable settlements, with elements from our different regions, were established there. In Drenica and Metohija we had no success. Colonization should never be done with Montenegrins alone. We do not think that they are unsuitable as colonists, because of their pastoral indolence. This applies only to the first generation. The second generation is quite different, more active and practical. Petrovo village in Miroc, above the Danube, the most advanced village of Kraijina is inhabited exclusively by Montenegrins. In Serbia today there are thousands of advanced economies, especially in Toplica and Kosanica which have been established by Montenegrins of the first generation, who have mixed with more advanced elements. This is especially valid for the old costumes managed to survive. A visit to the coffee-houses of Pec is sufficient to convince one of this. This is why our colonization has had so little success all over Metohija. It must be admitted, on the other hand, that these colonies have been poorly situated on unfertile scrub-covered land, and almost totally lacking in the most essential agricultural implements. But these should have been given more assistance than the others, because they are made up of the poorest Montenegrin elements.
    4. Without doubt, the main cause for the lack of our colonization in those regions was that in those regions was to take the land from the Albanians. The only possible way for our mass colonization of those regions was to take the land from the Albanians. After the war, at the time of the rebellion and actions of the insurgents, this could have been achieved easily by expelling part of Albanian population to Albania, by not legalizing their usurpation and by buying their pastures. Here we must return again to the gross error of our post-war concept. About the right to possession of the land they had usurped – scarcely any of them had title-deeds issued by the Turks, and those only for land purchased, to the determent of our nation and state, we not only legalized all these unsurpations, but worse still, accustomed the Albanians to West-European ideas about private property. Prior to that, they could have never have had these ideas. In this way, we ourselves handed them a weapon to defend themselves, to keep the best land for themselves and make the nationalization of one of the regions most important to us impossible.
    From all this it is apparent that the methods of our colonization policy in the south to date have not yielded the results which we ought to have achieved and which now impose themselves on us as a major state necessity. We have not criticized these methods merely for the sake of criticism , but so that on the basis of the experience, we can find the right ways to solve this problem.

    THE PROBLEM OF THE COLONIZATION OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONS
    Reading the first part of this paper, one immediately observes that, in examining the problem of colonization of the southern regions, the issue is mainly about the regions to the north and south of the Sar Mountain. This is not accidental. This is not accidental. This block of Albanians around the Sar Mountain has great national, state and strategic importance for our state. We have already mentioned the way it came into existence and the importance of this region for linking the regions around the Vardar Valley firmly with our ancient territories. The greatest force of the Serbian expansion ever since the beginnings of the first Serb State in the 9th century has always been based on the continuity of this expansion, as well as on the expansion of the ancient territories of Raska in all directions, hence including the expansion towards the south. This continuity has been interrupted by the Albanians and, until the ancient uninterrupted connection of Serbia and Montenegro with Macedonia along the whole of its extent from the Drin River to Southern Morava is reestablished we will not be secure in our possession of this territory. From the ethnic standpoint the Macedonians will fully unite with us only when they enjoy true ethnic support from Serbian motherland, which they have lacked to this day. This they will achieve only through the destruction of the Albanian block.
    From the military-strategic standpoint, the Albanian block occupies one of the most important positions of our country – the starting point from which the Balkan Rivers flow to the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea and the Agean Sea. The holding of this strategic positions, to a large degree, determines the fate of the Central Balkans, especially the fate of the main Balkan communication line from Morave to Vardar. It is no accident that many battles of decisive importance for the destiny of the Balkans (Nemanja against the Greeks the Serbs against the Turks in 1389, Hanyadj against the Turks 1446) have been fought here. In the 20th century, only that country that is inhabited by its own people can be sure of its security; therefore it is an imperative duty for all of us that we should not allow these positions of such strategic importance to be in the hands of the hostile and alien element. The more so since this element has the support of the national state of the same race. Today this state is powerless but even in this condition, it has become a base of Italian imperialism, which aims to use it to penetrate into the heart of oru state. Our elements will be willing and able to defend its own land and its own state, is the most reliable means we have against this penetration.
    Besides this block of 18 districts, the Albanians and other national minorities in the other parts of the southern regions are dispersed and therefore, not so dangerous to our national and state life. To nationalize the regions around the Sar Mountain means to bury any irredentism forever.
    The colonization from the north should be reduced in the regions inhabited by Macedonians. In these regions land is scarce, they are passive regions and, for this reason, the Macedonians resist the flow of settlers from the north, the more so because in these actions they see our distrust towards them. The truth is that even that small degree of colonization does us more harm than good. If people are to be sent down there south of Black Mountain of Skopje, they should be people from Vranje, Leskovac, who are closer to the Macedonians in mentality and culture and by no means the people from the Dynaric regions with their irritable uncontrolled temperament because such elements arouse the hatred of the local people. We repeat that this problem will be solved only when our colonies, advancing from the north through Kosovo and Metohija, towards the Sar Mountain, Polog meet the Macedonian settlements.
    The problem of Sandjak of Novi Pazar is solving itself and is no longer playing the role it played in our state life until 1912. We shall only mention that with the removal of the Albanians, the last link between our Moslems in Bosna and Novi Pazar and the rest of the Moslem world is cut. They are becoming religious minorities, the only Moslem minority in the Balkans, and this fact will accelerate their nationalization.
    Recently Montenegro has become a very grave problem. The poor land cannot sustain the population, but despite the removal this increased by 16 per cent from 1912 to 1931. Through the centuries, this turbulent pastoral element has contributed essential features in our race. Channeled in the right direction, their energies will not be destructive, but we can be employed to the general benefit of the state, if they are directed to southeast.
    Summing-up
    The Albanians cannot be repulsed by means of gradual colonization alone; they are the only people who, during the last millennium managed not only to resist the nucleus of our state but also to harm us by pushing our ethnic borders northwards and eastwards. Whereas in the last millennium our ethnic borders were shifted to Subotica in the north and Kupa in Northwest, the Albanians drove us from the Skadar and its region, the former capital city of Bodin, from Metohija and Kosovo. The only way and the only means to cope with them is the brute force of an organized state, in which we have always been superior to them. If since 1912 we have had no success in the struggle against the, we are to blame for this, as we have not used this power as we should have done. It is not possible to speak of any national assimilation of the Albanians in our favor. On the contrary, because they base themselves on Albania, their national awareness is awakened and if we do not settle accounts with them at the proper time, within 20-30 years we shall have to cope with a terrible irridentism, the signs of which are already apparent and which will inevitably put all our southern territories in jeopardy.

    THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF COLONIZATION
    If we proceed from the assumption that the gradual displacement of the Albanians through our gradual colonization is ineffective then we are left with only one course – that of their mass resettlement. In this case we must consider two states – Albania and Turkey.
    With its sparse population, it’s many undrained swamps and uncultivated river valleys Albania would be in position to admit some hundred thousands Albanians from our country. With its large uninhabited and uncultivated territories in Asia Minor and Jurdistan, modern Turkey has almost boundless possibilities for internal colonization. However despite all the efforts of Kamal Ataturk, the Turks have not yet filled the vacuum created as a result of the removal of the Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and some of the Turks to Persia. Hence the greatest possibilities are that the bulk of displaced Albanians might be sent there.
    First, we stress that we should not limit ourselves to diplomatic steps with the Ankara government only, but should employ all means to convince Tirana to accept some of our displaced people. I believe that this will come up against difficulties in Tirana, because Italy will try to hinder this process. However, money plays great role in Tirana. In the talks about this question, the Albanian Government should be informed that we shall stop at nothing to achieve our final solution to this question, while at the same time we should tell them about subsidies for colonization, over which no control will be exercised; eventually, through secret channels, the notables in Tirana may be persuaded by material gain to raise no opposition to this whole business.
    As we have heard, Turkey has agreed to accept some 200.000 of our displaced people initially, on condition that they are Albanians, something which is most advantageous to us. We must comply with this desire of Turkey readily and sign a convention about the resettlement of the Albanian population as soon as possible. In connection with the resettlement of the Albanian population we must study the conventions which Turks has signed recently on these questions with Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria, paying attention to two things: that Turkey should accept the largest contingent, while from the financial aspect it should be given the maximum assistance, especially in the matter of organizing their transportation as quickly as possible. Undoubtedly this problem will give rise to some international concern, which is inevitable in such cases. Over the last hundred years, whenever such actions have taken place in the Balkans, there has always been some power which has protested because such an action did not conform to its interests. In the present instance, Albania and Italy may make some protest. As to Albania, we have already pointed out that attempts should be made to conclude a convention with it over this problem and if we don’t achieve this we should at least secure its silence over the question of removal of the Albanians to Turkey. We repeat that skilful action and money properly used in Tirana may de decisive in this matter. World opinion, especially that financed by Italy will be upset a little. Nevertheless, the world today has grown used to things much worse than this and should not be a cause for concern. At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews and Russia can shift millions of people from one part of the continent to another, the shifting of few hundred thousand Albanians will not lead to the outbreak of a World War. However, those who decide should know what they want and persist in achieving this, regardless of the possible’ international obstacles.
    Italy, no doubt will raise more difficulties, but at present it is extremely occupied with its own problems in connection with Abyssinia and Austria and will not dare go very far in its opposition. To tell the truth, the greatest danger lies in the possibility that our great allies, France and Britain might interfere. They must be given a clear and resolute answer that the security of Morina-Vardar line in their interests, a thing which was confirmed on the last great war, and it will be made more secure, both for them and for us, only when we completely dominate the regions around the Sar mountain and Kosovo from the ethnic aspect.

    THE MODE OF REMOVAL
    As we have already stressed, the mass removal of the Albanians from their triangle is the only effective course for us. To bring about the relocation of a whole population and the first prerequisite is the creation of the suitable psychosis. It can be created in many ways.
    As is known the Moslem masses, in general, are very readily influenced, especially by religion, are superstitious and fanatical. Therefore, first of all we must win over their clergy and men of influence, through money or threats to support the relocation of the Albanians. Agitators to advocate this removal must be found, as quickly as possible, especially from Turkey if it will provide them for us. They must describe the beauties in the new territories in Turkey, the easy and pleasant life there, kindle religious fanaticism and awaken pride in the Turkish state among the masses. Our press can be of colossal by help well they have settled down in the new regions. These descriptions will create necessary predisposition to shift among the mass of Albanians here.
    Another means would be coercion by the state apparatus. The law must be enforced to the letter so as to make staying intolerable for the Albanians: fines, and imprisonment, the ruthless application of all police dispositions, such as on the prohibition of smuggling, cutting forests, damaging agriculture, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labor and any other measure that an experienced police force can contrive. From the Economic aspect: the refusal to recognize the old land deeds, the work with the land register should immediately include public debts, requisitioning of all state and communal pastures, the cancellation of concessions, the withdrawal of permits to exercise a profession, dismissal from the state, private and communal offices etc., will hasten the process of their removal. Heath measures: the brutal application of all the dispositions even in the homes, the pulling down of encircling walls and high edges around the houses, the rigorous application of veterinary measures which will result in impending the sale of livestock in the market etc. also can be applied in an effective and practical way. When it comes to religion the Albanians are very touchy, therefore they must be harassed on this score, too. This can be achieved through ill-treatment of their clergy, the destruction of their clergy, the destruction of their cemeteries, the prohibition of polygamy, and especially the inflexible application of the law compelling girls to attend elementary schools, wherever they are.
    Private initiative, too, can assist greatly in this direction. We should distribute weapons to our colonists, as need be. The old forms of cetnik actions should be organized and secretly assisted. In particular, a tide of Montenegrins should be launched from the mountain pastures in order to create a large-scale conflict with the Albanians in Metohija. This conflict should be prepared by means of our trusted people. It should be encouraged and this can be done more easily since, in fact, Albanians have revolted, while the whole affair should be presented as a conflict between clans and, if need be, ascribed to economic reasons. Finally, local riots can be incited. These will be bloodily suppressed with the most effective means but by the colonists from the Montenegrin clans and the cetniks, rather than by means of the army.
    There remains one more means, which Serbia employed with great practical effect after 1878, that is, by secretly burning down villages and city quarters.

    THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REMOVAL
    From the attached map it is apparent what regions must be cleared. They are: Upper Debar, Lower Polog, Upper Polog, Sar Mountain, Drenica, Pec, Istok, Vucitrin, Stavica, Lab and Kacanik. Among these regions which together compromise the Albanian wedge, the most important for us are: Pec, Dakovica, Prodrimja, Goda, Podgor, Sar, Istok, and Drenica – north of the Sar Mountain as well as the Upper Debar and the two Pologs, in the south, and the Sar Mountain These are border regions which must be cleared of Albanians at any cost. The internal regions such as Kacanik, Gilan, Nerodimje, Gracanica, Lab, Vucirin, etc must be weakened if possible, especially that of Kacanik and Lab, while the others should be gradually and systematically colonized over a period of decades.
    The above-mentioned means should be used in the first place in the border regions, if we wish to clear them of Albanians.
    During the resettlement the following must be kept in mind:
    In the first place, resettlement should begin in the villages and then in towns. Being more compact, the villagers are more dangerous. Then, the mistake of removing only the poor should be avoided: the middle and rich strata make up the backbone of every nation, therefore, they, too must be persecuted and driven out. Lacking the support which their economically independent compatriots have, the poor submit more quickly. This question has great importance, and I emphasize this because one of the main causes for the lack of success of our colonization in the south is that the poor were expelled while the rich remained, thus we were no further forward, because we gained very little land for the settlement of our colonists. During the creation of the psychosis for the resettlement, everything possible must be done to send off whole villages, or at least whole families. The situation that part of the family is shifted while others remain behind, must be prevented at all costs. Our state is not going to spend millions to make life easier for the Albanians, but to get rid of as many of them as possible. For this reason the purchase of the land of the Albanians who shift by those who remain behind must be absolutely prohibited. The shifting of individuals and whole villages must be linked with this question, if they want things made easy for them during the process of the relocation.
    Once they agree to shift, all-round aid should be given them. The administrative procedure should be simplified, their property should be paid for on the spot, travel documents should be issued without the least formality and they should be assisted to get to the nearest railway station; trains should be made available for them, as far as Salonica, and thence they should be immediately shipped to Asia. It is very important, that the journey should be easy, comfortable and cheap. Possibly, the travel by train should be free and they should be assisted with food because whether or not large masses will shift, depends largely on this. The fear of difficulties on the journey will be a major obstacle to their moving. Therefore this must be combated by solving all the problems connected with the journey, quickly and energetically. Particular care must be taken to ensure that they have the fewest possible difficulties over the journey, because simple folk orientate themselves with difficulty, therefore it would be advisable to study the system of workers transport by the big travel agencies and use that. The displaced person must pass from hand to hand without feeling the burden of this movement. Only in this way it is possible to create that flow of displaced Albanians which will empty our south of them.

    POPULATING THE DEPOPULATED REGIONS
    The problems of the establishment of colonies in the depopulated regions is not less important than the removal of the Albanians.
    The first question emerges: Who should be settled there? The most natural thing is to people them with our elements from the passive regions, in the first place Montenegrins are the most appropriate for several reasons, because Metohija, Drenica, and Kosovo are most natural places into which they flow from their impoverished mountains. The increase of population in Montenegro has brought about poverty, which in recent times has given rise to continual socio-political unrest unfavorable to our state power and very dangerous to law and order in the future. Giving them maize and pensions is useless. The only solutions is to send them to the fertile regions of Metohija, Drenica and Kosovo. Then, since they are akin to the Albanians in mentally and temperament, the Montenegrins are the most appropriate as instruments to overcome them. In the first place, they must be used in the regions north of Sar Mountain; however along with them some people from Lican, Krajsnica, Serbia, Cacak, Uzice, and Toplica should be used as colonists. This is necessary in order to create better habits of work and organization among the Montenegrins, to break down their nomadic-group psychology, the spirit of collectivity which characterizes the highlanders, by means of mixing and intermarriage with people from various Dinaric regions; in this way a new type of Montenegrin with a less local but broader, more Serbian outlook, will be formed.
    Suitable conditions should be created for the Southern Serb Emigrants living in the regions south of Sar Mountain so that they can take possession of the fertile lands. They are honest, hardworking people, who will be grateful to this state all their lives if pleasant conditions for life in countryside are created for them. The rural Southern Serbs in general have a right to expect more care and attention than we are giving them today. The colonization of Polog (Upper and Lower) and Debar with these paupers, as well as allocating pastures to them instead of the Albanians, will make them feel that this is their state, and they will know to defend its borders.
    Apart from them, the colonization south of SAR Mountain and the Black mountain of Skopje can be done with Serbs from Vranje, Leskovac, Pirot and Blasenica, especially those from passive mountain villages. We repeat that the Dinarics should not be allowed to extend to the south of the line formed by the Black Mountain of Skopje and the SAR mountain.
    During the colonization of the villages emptied of Albanians, it is essential to avoid bureaucratic delays and petty formalities. The first immediate action is to give the colonists title to the land on which they are settled. One of the main reasons for the lack of success of the colonization so far has been that the colonist has not felt secure on the land on which he was settled, because he did not receive title to it immediately, and thus was exposed to ill-treatment at the hands of unscrupulous clerks and politicians. The peasant feels secure in his possession of land only when he knows that no one can shift him for it. Therefore he can not have unrestricted ownership of this property. Because there are many different people among them, such as village proletarians who have lost their feeling for the land, or herdsmen who have to adopt themselves to agriculture, they must be linked with the land by the force of law. This is because they must begin to love their new regions and home, and if they, themselves, do not succeed in this, at least their children should. For this reason the colonists should be prevented by law from gaining full ownership of the land for not less than 30 years, even though they are given the title immediately. According to our law, in our country the woman does not enjoy the right of inheritance to land. In order to avoid fragmentation of the land into small parcels, women must be excluded from the inheritance to colonized lands, expect in cases when the colonist has no male descendants and plans to bring a bridegroom into the household. The properties which have been given to the colonists up till now have been small. Bearing in mind the extensive methods of farming, the fall of prices for agricultural products, as well as the large families of the colonists, 5-10 hectares of land is insufficient to ensure the conditions for the economic development of the colonists. It is better to settle a region with smaller number colonists with better conditions for development, rather than a large number of rural semi-proletarians. This, too, has been another major cause of our lack of success to date in the colonization of the south and the north.
    Elements so suitable for colonization in such difficult conditions as we have are rare among other peoples. Those few successes we have achieved in the policy of colonization are the result of these colonizing qualities of race. Only our peasant, up against scrubland and ground that had never been worked shifted from one environment to another was capable of surviving in such different circumstances. What wouldn’t he be able to do if the state were to give him the things it has the duty to provide.
    On February 10, 1865 the Government of Prince Mihajlos promulgated the law on the Settlement of Foreigners in Serbia. Under this law, the Serbian Government granted poor colonists from neighboring regions 3 jutra of arable land and 3 jutra of non arable land, a house, a joke of oxen, a cart, two goats, or sheep, a sow, the necessary work tools and 120 grosh in cash. Apart from this, obviously maize for food to last them till the first harvest. One plough was provided for every two families. These fixed and movable assets were given to the colonizers for use without the right to sell them for a term of 15 years. At the end of this term, they became property. For the first 5 years the settlers were exempt from all kinds of state taxes, for 10 years they were exempt from the Universal compulsory military service in the regular army and exempt from service in the people’s militia for 5 years. The response from all sides was such that within a few months all the places were filled and more territory was colonized than we have been able to do in several years since the war. If the state had created these favorable conditions for the colonists after 1918, our situation both in Vojvodina and in Southern Serbia would not be as it is. This is how we must act in the future, if we want success.
    The method of colonization of Toplica and Kosvanica after 1878 when the Albanians were expelled from these regions, is also full of lessons. The method for our colonization of these regions was laid down in the law of January 3, 1880. On February 3 of the same year, the People’s Council approved the law on the amendment of agrarian relations according to the principle the land to the peasants. Without hesitation, Serbia sought its first foreign loan in order to pay Turkey for the lands taken. It did not set up any ministry of agrarian reform or costly apparatus for the problem of colonization, but everything was done in a simple and practical manner. The police organs distributed the land to all those who wanted to till it. People came from Montenegro, Sjenica, Vranie, Kosovo, Pec etc. and 30 years after 1878. Toplica and Kosanica, once Albanian regions of ill-repute, gave Serbia the finest regiment in the wars of 1912-1918, the Iron Second Regiment. In those wars, Toplica and Kosanica paid and repaid, with blood of their sons, those tens of millions of dinars which Serbia had spent for their resettlement.
    Only by following these examples and knowing what is required, sparing neither money nor blood, can our state create a new Toplica in Kosovo and Metohija. Hence, if we want these colonists to remain where they are, they must be assured of acquiring all the means of livelihood within few years. We must ruthlessly prohibit any speculations with the houses and properties of displaced Albanians. The state must reserve for itself the unlimited right to dispose of the fixed and movable assets of the people transferred and must settle its own colonists there immediately after the departure of the Albanians. This must be done, because it will rarely happen that a while village departs at once. The first to be settled in these villages should be the Montenegrins, as arrogant, irascible and merciless people, who will drive the remaining Albanians away with their behavior, and then colonists from other regions can be brought in.
    This paper deals with the problem of the colonization of the Southern Serbia Only. The problem of Vojvodina especially the Hungarian triangle in Backa, Senta-Kula-Backa Topola is not less important to us. To destroy this triangle in Vojvodina is tantamount to destroying the Albanian Block around the SAR Mountain. Following the division of the big estates, there remain tens of thousands of Hungarian farm-hands who today are a great burden on the Serbian and German middle peasant of Vojvodina. Some of these Hungarian and even German farm laborers and small proprietors must be sent to the south, because in Backs, on the border with Hungary, they represent a danger, the more so since the Serbs in Backa comprise only 25 per cent of the population. In Southern Serbia, by defending their properties against Albania, they will become good citizens, who will integrate themselves with our masses and, what is more important, being more progressive and of a higher cultural level than our peasants, they will provide an example of advanced methods of the cultivation of the land. We emphasize in particular that the Serbs of Vojvodina should not be sent to the south for colonization. In Vojvodina there is still land for colonization, therefore, they must be given land there. We stress also, that during the period of 1928-1929 there was a widespread movement among the Hungarians and Germans of Vojvodina to move to Southern Serbia, but not knowing the problems our unclear opinion opposed this movement and nipped it in the bud. Another such attempt in this direction should be impended and our public must be instructed to support the movement of the Hungarians and Germans from Vojvodina, and especially from Back to the South.

    THE COLONIZATION APPARATUS
    Of special importance for the solution of the question under discussion is the existence of an apparatus to direct the whole business. The poor work of the apparatus which has implemented our policy of colonization so far is the reason for the good part of our lack of success to date. To avoid this in the future, a reorganization must be carried out.
    No other question demands such continuity in its implementation as colonization does. We have pointed out that one of the main reasons for the lack of success of our colonization in the north and in the south is the inconsistent work and changing policy with each change of government. If this is to be avoided in the future, the colonization should be entrusted to General Staff. Why? Simply for the reason of defense. Our army is interested in settling our own elements along the borders especially the moste delicate sectors. To this end, it will do its utmost to secure the borders with the firmest possible colonization. The General Staff, as the prime institution for the defense of our National Interests, can contribute a great deal to our whole policy of colonization. The General Staff will know how to protect the implementation of the policy of colonization from private interference by those who want to used it for their personal interests and from any external influence. Another important fact is that it would be easier for the General Staff to convince the responsible bodies of the importance if the issue and make them take effective decisions. The People’s Council will have more faith in it and will grant the necessary credits to it more readily than to others.
    The General Staff would guide all the work through a State Council for colonization. This council would be quiet independent, but directly under the control of the Chief of the General Staff, and would have all the organs of our colonization under its control. Representatives of several interested ministries, the national association, technical and scientific institutions, should be brought into this council.
    The greatest mistake of our colonization policy lay in the fact that the untrained and incompetent bureaucracy had the main say in it, and it dealt with the problems a bit at a time, without going into them thoroughly. Let us only recall the colonization of our
    volunteers from Hungary at Ovce Polje, Kadrifikovo or the emigrants from Istra and Gorica who settled around Demir Kapija. This requeires the close linking of the state power, private initiative and scientific institutions with our colonization policy. Private initiatives can operate operate in many directions. The People’s Defense, the Sokolasas, the Cetnik Association, etc. could undertake actions against the Albanians, in which it is appropriate for the state to be involved. The association of agronomists, doctors, engineers the cooperatives etc. can assist very well through their technical councils to solve many problems which arise during the process of our colonization. The cultural associations, too, such as Prosveta in Sarajevo, Matica Srbska in Novi Sad, the Sv. Sava association in Belgrade etc. also have their tasks in connection with this question.
    Undoubtedly, our higher scientific institutions have begun their former prestige. The main reason for this is that the University and the Academy of Sciences are becoming more and more removed from real life and neglecting the chief task they have in a relatively backward country, such as ours – opening the ways for the application of the scientific achievements of the 20th century. Many billions would have been saved in this country, many mistakes would have been avoided in our state policy, including our colonization policy, had the problems been studies seriously and objectively in advance by our competent scientific workers before they were taken up for solution. Our policy of colonization, likewise, would have acquired a more serious approach, greater continuity and effective application had the opinions of experts and scientific workers been sought in advance. In the first place, the Royal Serbian Academy of Sciences and the University of Belgrade ought to take the initiative to organize thorough scientific study of the whole problem of colonization in our country. This would be possible for many reasons. At the University we have experts on every question connected with colonization in our country. The teachers and academicians at the University are independent workers, less subject to external political influence. They already have good experience in such work and their scientific activity is a guarantee of objectivity. Therefore they should take the initiative to set up the colonization institute, the task of which would be to engage in the study of colonization. The state for its part, should detach from several ministries all the institutions which have been engaged with this problem so far, and create a special institution, “The Colonization Inspection Office”.
    The Colonization Inspection Office would be headed by the Inspector General, appointed by decree on the proposal of the Minster of War, the Chief of General Staff, and the Prime Minister. All the work in the colonization institute and the Colonization Inspection Office would be carried out on orders from and under the supervision of the State Council, while the Inspector General would be answerable to the Chief of the General Staff.
    The Colonization Institute would be divided into the following sections: 1) Organization, 2) Education and Culture, 3) Finance, 4) agriculture, 5) construction, 6) hygiene etc. In agreement with the scientific cultural-educational associations, the sections would study problems of colonization and prepare directives, thus supplying our colonization policy with a solid, scientifically worked out material from which to make decisions. At the head of this institute would be people from the State Council, made up of the representatives of the ministries mentioned, the University, the Academy of Sciences and those of private, national and educational-cultural organizations who would be elected or appointed to this council. In this case care must be taken not to bring people just for honor’s sake, but men who love and are dedicated to this great work.
    The heads and employees of the Institute should be selected through competition. The institute would supply the Colonization Inspection Office with scientifically worked out materials for the implementation of the colonization policy. In cases of differences of opinion between the Colonization Inspection Office and the institute over some fundamental question, the Chief of the General Staff would have the decisive way.
    The Colonization Inspection Office must have its executive organs in the territory, made up of people selected for their enthusiasm and readiness for this work, whether or not they are employed by the state. Therefore they should possible be selected through competition and be appointed upon proposal by the Chief of the General Staff, while as to its work, the Colonization Inspection Office and its organs must avoid the bureaucratic formalities as much as possible, while keeping in mind only one thing – the removal of the Albanians as quickly as possible and the settlement of our colonists.
    The police apparatus will play a very important role in this matter. Therefore it is necessary to select the most energetic and honest officers and send them there. Their transfer should be done with the approval of the Chief of the General Staff, and for such a difficult job they should be paid from secret credits. Stern measures must be taken against any of them who commits the slightest infringement. A special commissar would execute the orders of the state colonization inspector must be appointed for the whole territory of the 18 districts mentioned. Prefects of districts must be given special wide powers for the work and the respective instructions. Our political parties should be told curtly that rivalry between parties in elections is categorically prohibited in those districts, and that any interference by the deputies in favor of Albanians is categorically forbidden.
    The state Institute and the inspection Office for colonization will work out the technical details of organizing the removal of the Albanians and the establishment of our settlers. It would not be bad, perhaps, if another private organization were created besides these two official institutions, which would be based on the existing associations and have the task of assisting the implementation of our colonization policy through private initiative. It would be best if the League of our cultural-educational associations were to undertake this work. It would concern itself with coordinating the work of the private associations with the state policy for colonization and would assist liaison between them and the Colonization Institute.

    FINANCIAL MEANS
    Whenever our colonization policy has been criticized for its lack of success, its defenders have always excused themselves with the inadequate financial means the state has allocated for this work. We do not deny that it is sup op to the point, although it must be admitted that more has been spent in our country on the maintenance of this apparatus and its irrational work than on the colonization itself. Nevertheless, if we the state has not provided as it should, it must be understood that every state to ensure the holding of the insecure national regions, by colonizing these regions with its own national elements, must be included among the primary interests. All other commitments rank inferior to this task and this commitment. For this problem, money can and must be found. We have already mentioned the instance of Toplica and Kosanica and the benefits it had from this. When the small Serbian Kingdom did not hesitate to make great financial sacrifices, indeed did not hesitate, as a free and independent Kingdom, to seek its first loan for colonization, can it be said that our present-day Yugoslavia is unable to do such a thing? It can and must do it, and it is not true that it lacks the means to do it. Let us reckon approximately how much it would cost our state to transplant 200.000 Albanians and establish as great a number of our settlers.
    The resettlement of 40.000 Albanian families – taking an average family as 5 members and an average of 15.000 dinars per each family would cost a total of 600 million dinars. The colonization expenditure for the settling of our 40.000 of our families may reach a total of 200 million dinars. In any case the whole thing will not cost more than 800 million dinars. This is why:
    1. The transplanted Albanians will leave not only the land but also their houses and implements. Thus, not only will the overwhelming majority of our settlers assistance with live stock and food, they will recover themselves economically and become independent. For this reason we emphasize here, too, that private speculations with the possessions left by the Albanians must not be permitted in any way, but the state must take them and give them to the settlers.
    2. During the settling up of the new colonies, military forces should be employed, where required, as was the case with construction of Sremska-Raca and the reconstruction of the villages destroyed in 1931 by the earthquake in the south. To this end, the army should be given the right and possibility a kind of obligatory labor service for public projects, just as Stambolisky in Bulgaria created the Trundova Pronist and Hitler created the Arbeitsdienst, in Germany by calling up reservists or extending the term of the military service. It would be especially good that our trained youth, after their graduation from the University are charged with this task. In this case, by taking part in constructive work in general interest, many of them would become more conscious and look at things more realistically. This can be easily applied by giving priority in entering state employment to those youth who spend a definite period in work for our colonization policy. This would also reduce the unemployment among our young intelligentsia, which is becoming an increasingly difficult social problem in our country.
    3. In the agreement with the specialized organizations and associations, the least costly ways must be sought for clearing land of scrub, irrigation, draining swamps, etc. well as for building houses. Private entrepreneurs should be informed that during their work to secure the necessary materials, the state helps them with reduced customs and railway tariffs, credits and other means, so that for such an important work the state has the right to demand from them supplies of materials at the lowest possible prices. The question of securing the materials should be solved directly through cartels and then, in agreement with them, the state will define both the quantity, quality and the price of the materials without fictitious deals. The state enterprises, the railways and especially forest enterprises such as Sipad etc. should be placed totally at the disposal of the State Council for Colonization.
    4. During the colonization the state may grant the settlers property on credit or for cash. Many of them will buy land in new regions, selling their properties in their birthplaces. From this the state will regain a good part of the money it has laid out. However, we stress that the land must be sold only who provide proof that they will settle it permanently and work it. The land given on credit must not be very dear. The rate of interest must be minimal and the repayment should be deferred for several years to give settler time to establish himself i.e. until he has gained strength from the economic aspect.
    Taking this as a basis, the state can find the means from two sources. The State must undertake all the expenditures for the administration of this work and cover it from its normal income. This it can do by pruning unnecessary expenditure or expenditure from other spheres which are not so immediately urgent. The other possible financial source would be loans, which would be provided by the state banks, alone or jointly with our private capital through a compulsory internal loan. This would be based on securities issued by the state as well as on the contributions of the settlers, when they become independent.
    It might not be a bad idea if financing and purchase of lands were done by the agricultural banks in collaboration with the cooperativist unions, under the direct supervision and on the basis of the directives of the State Council for Colonization. However, it is still early to give any definite opinion on this problem, because the conditions on which Turkey will accept the population displaced from our territories are not known.
    Altogether, a sum of few hundred million dinars is a small expenditure for the state, in comparison with the real benefits it will gain from such a move. By securing our most sensitive point in the south through the settlement of our national elements we have several divisions in case of war. By settling these tens of thousands of families from our passive regions, especially Montenegro, as colonists, the intolerable economic crisis in those regions will be eased, and on the other hand, as a result of the great amount of work that will be opened during the colonization, it will be possible to find employment 10.000 workers, thus giving an impulse to our sluggish economy.
    For such an important national, military, strategic and economic task, it is the duty of the state to sacrifice a few hundred million dinars. At a time when it can spend one billion dinars for the construction of the international highway from Subotica to Caribrod, and possible benefit from which we shall enjoy only in the distant future, it can and must find a few hundred million dinars, which will put us back in possession in the cradle of our state.

    CONCLUSION
    In the view of all that has been said above, it is no accident that in our examination of the question of colonization in the south, we proceed from the view that the only effective method for solving this problem is the mass resettlement of the Albanians. Just as in other countries, gradual colonization has had no success in our country. When the state wants to intervene in favor of its own element, in struggle for the land, it can be successful only if it acts brutally. Otherwise, the native with his roots in his birthplace and acclimatized there, is always stronger than the colonist. In our case, this must be kept especially well in mind, because we have to do it with a rugged, resistant and prolific race, which the late Cvijic describes as the most expansive in the Balkans. From 1870 to 1914 Germany spent billions of marks for the gradual colonization of its eastern regions by purchasing land from the poles, but the fecundity of the Polish mothers defeated German organizations and money. This Poland regained its Pozan in 1918. Our statistics of the 1921-31 period, which we have already mentioned, show that the fecundity of the Albanian women defeated our colonization policy too. From this we must draw a conclusion, and do so quickly while there is still time to correct matters.
    All Europe is in a state of turmoil. We do not know what each day and night may bring. Albanian nationalism is mounting in our territories too. To leave the situation as it is would mean, in case of any world conflict our social revolution, both of which are possible in the near future, to jeopardize all our territories in the south. The purpose of this paper is to aver such a thing.
    D. Vaso Cubrilovic

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    DIE VERTREIBUNG DER ALBANER
    von Prof. Dr. Vasa Cubrilovic

    Denkschrift, vorgelegt am 7 März 1937 in Belgrad
    (Archiv der ehemaligen jugoslawischen Armee; das Dokument ist als "Vertraulich" bezeichnet unter dem Verweis "Nr. 2, Ordner 4, Kiste 69")
    V. Cubrilovic; * 1897, Akademiemitglied Jugoslawiens, ehemaliger politischer Berater in der königlichen Regierung. 1914 Mitglied der serbischen nationalistischen Organisation "Neues Bosnien". Diplom an der Universität Belgrad, ab 1930 dort als Professor an der Philosophischen Fakultät tätig. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war V. C. Minister in verschiedenen Ressorts der Regierung der SFRJ, Mitglied der serbischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste, Sekretär der Wissenschaftlichen Abteilung dieser Akademie, Mitglied des Bundes der Kommunisten Jugoslawiens. 1970 Direktor des Balkanologischen Instituts in Belgrad. Am 7. März 1937 legte er in Belgrad der königlichen Regierung von Stojadinovic seine Denkschrift über die "Vertreibung der Arnauten (Albaner)" vor.

    DIE VERTREIBUNG DER ALBANER
    Das Albanerproblem in unserem nationalen und staatlichen Leben besteht nicht erst seit gestern. Es hat im Mittelalter bereits eine große Rolle gespielt, nahm jedoch gegen Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts entscheidend an Bedeutung zu, als die Serben aus den alten ehemaligen Gegenden von Raska in Massen Richtung Norden zogen, während die albanischen Bergbewohner gerade in ihr Land kamen. Sie stiegen allmählich aus ihren Bergen herunter und ließen sich in den fruchtbaren Ebenen von Metohija und Kosovo nieder, und dehnten sich nach Norden vordringend in Richtung Süd- und Nordwest aus. Durchquerten die Sar Planina Richtung Polog und stiegen von dort, auf Vardar zugehend, herunter. Auf diese Weise wurde bis Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts das albanische Dreieck geschaffen, das sich auf die eigene Basis Debar-Rogozna und das eigene ethnische Hinterland stützend, tief nach Nis hinzog und unsere angestammten Gebiete in Raska von Mazedonien und dem Vardar-Tal abtrennte.
    Diese albanische, von albanischen anarchistischen Elementen bevölkerte Keil, vereitelte im 19 Jahrhundert jede Art von festen Bildung-, Kultur- und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen unseren nördlichen und südlichen Gebieten. Das war der Hauptgrund, daß Serbien bis 1878, als es über Vranje und die Crna Gora bei Skopje ständige Verbindungen mit Mazedonien herstellen und aufrecht halten konnte, und nicht über jenen kulturellen und politischen Einfluß zu verfügen vermochte, den man angesichts der günstigen geographischen Verkehrsverbindungen und der historischen Traditionen in diesen Gegenden eigentlich erwartet hatte. Obwohl die Bulgaren ihr staatliches Leben später als die Serben begannen, waren sie am Anfang erfolgreicher. Das war der Grund, daß es von Widin im Norden bis herunter nach Ohrid im Süden von Südslawen ständig bewohnte Städte gab. Diesen albanischen Keil begann Serbien, schon im ersten Aufstand zu zersetzen, indem es die nördlichsten albanischen Bewohner, von Jagodina ausgehend, verjagte.
    Dank der breiten Staatskonzepte von Jovan Ristic trennte Serbien nach dem Anschluß von Toplica und Kosanica auch einen Teil von diesem Keil los. Damals waren die Gebiete vom Jastrebac bis Südmorava radikal von Albanern gesäubert worden.
    Den übrigen Teil des albanischen Dreiecks zu zerschlagen, war seit 1918 Aufgabe unseres heutigen Staates. Er tat es nicht. Es gibt einige Gründe dafür, doch werden wir nur auf die wichtigsten eingehen.
    1. Der Grundfehler der kompetenten Behörden jener Zeit bestand darin, daß sie die Lösung der großen ethnischen Fragen auf dem blutigen und aufgewühlten Balkan vergessend, wo sie sich befanden, durch westliche Methoden erreichen wollten. Die Türkei brachte aus Sheriat entlehnte Sitten auf den Balkan, denen zufolge durch den Sieg im Krieg und die Eroberung eines Landes das Recht auf Leben und Eigentum der Unterworfener Staatsbürger erlangt wird. Von den Türken lernten auch die balkanischen Christen, daß man mit dem Schwert nicht nur Macht und Herrschaft, sondern auch Haus und Eigentum gewinnt oder verliert. Dieses Konzept, das mit den Verhältnissen des Privatrechts auf Boden, auf dem Balkan zusammenhängt, bot die Möglichkeit in sich, durch internationale Gesetze, Anordnungen und Vereinbarungen, die unter dem Druck Europas hervorgebracht wurden, bis zu einem gewissen Grad entschärft zu werden. Doch noch bis in unsere Tage ist dieses Konzept gewissermaßen der Haupthebel der Türken und der Balkanstaaten gewesen. Wir brauchen gar nicht die entferntere Vergangenheit in Betracht zu ziehen. Wir wollen lediglich einige Fälle aus jüngeren Tagen erwähnen: Die Umsiedlung der Griechen von Kleinasien nach Griechenland, der Türken von Griechenland nach Kleinasien, die letzte Umsiedlung der Türken aus Bulgarien und Rumänien in die Türkei. Während alle Balkanländer seit 1912 die Frage der nationalen Minderheiten durch Umsiedlung entweder gelöst haben oder im Begriff stehen zu lösen, sind wir bei den langsamen und trägen Methoden der Schrittweisen Kolonisation geblieben. Ihre Ergebnisse waren negativ. Das dem so ist, davon zeugen bestens die Statistiken der 18 Bezirke, die das albanische Dreieck ausmachen. Aus den statistischen Angaben geht hervor, daß der natürliche Zuwachs der Albaner in jenen Gegenden größer ist als die Gesamtzahl unseres natürlichen Zuwachses zusammen mit den Kolonisten (von 1921 bis 1931 vermehrten sich die Albaner um 68.060, während sich die Serben um 58.743 vermehrt hatten; die Differenz beträgt 9315 zugunsten der Albaner). Wenn man den wilden Charakter und den ausgeprägten Zuwachs der Albaner sowie die immer schwierigeren Bedingungen der Kolonisation nach den alten Methoden berücksichtigt, wird dieses Mißverhältnis mit der Zeit immer größer werden; am Ende wird es auch die bescheidenen Kolonisationserfolge, die wir seit 1918 bis heute erreicht haben, in Frage stellen.
    2. Selbst die Methode der schrittweisen Kolonisation wurde nicht im erforderlichen Maße durchgeführt. Das Schlechteste dabei ist, daß es für ein dermaßen wichtiges Problem keinen festgelegten Staatsplan gab, der für jede Regierung und jedes Regime verbindlich gewesen wäre. Man arbeitete stückweise, in den Tag hinein, jeder Minister zerstörte das, was sein Vorgänger geleistet hatte, wobei auch er selbst nichts solides zustande brachte. Man änderte Gesetze und Verordnungen, doch wurden sie, so schwach sie auch waren, nicht einmal umgesetzt. Einige Leute, insbesondere Abgeordnete, gesetzt den Fall sie kämen aus anderen Bezirken, gingen herunter in den Süden, wenn es ihnen nicht gelang ein Mandat für ihren eigenen Bezirk zu erobern, und schmeichelten, die großen nationalen und staatlichen Interessen auf diese Weise opfernd, den nicht nationalen Elementen, um ein Mandat zu erobern. Der Kolonisationsapparat war ungeheuer kostspielig, aufgebläht und voller Leute, die nicht nur unfähig, sondern häufig auch skrupellos waren, so daß ihre Arbeit in Wirklichkeit eine besondere Frage darstellte. Man sollte ruhig einmal eine großen Geldsummen zusammenrechnen, die dieser Staat in die Kolonisation investierte, und sie auf die Anzahl der kolonisierten Familien umrechnen, um zu sehen, wie teuer jedes nach dem Krieg errichtete Haus war, ohne die Frage zu berücksichtigen, ob sie von den Kolonisten oder vom Staat gebaut wurden. Ebenso interessant wäre es, die Proportionen zwischen den Privatausgaben und den, für unsere Kolonisation verausgabten Materialien in Betracht zu ziehen. Früher jedenfalls hat Serbien dieses Problem anders gelöst. Während des ersten Aufstands verfügten Karageorg, Milo, Mihailo, Jovan Ristic über kein besonderes Agrar- Reformministerium, weder über Agrargeneralinspekteure noch über einen teueren Apparat. Trotzdem säuberten sie Serbien vom fremden Element, bevölkerten es mit eigenen Bewohnern, rodeten die endlosen Wälder der Sumadija, und machten aus der einstmals wilden Gegend die heutige fruchtbare Sumadija.
    3. Auch die mehrere Tausend zählenden Familien, die sich nach dem Krieg niedergelassen haben, schlugen an den neuen Orten keine Wurzeln. In Kosovo gab es mehr Erfolg, insbesondere im Labi- Tal, wo die Toplicaner selbst von Norden nach Süden vordrangen. Hier wurden die ältesten und stabilsten Kolonien mit vermischten Elementen aus unseren verschiedenen Gebieten gegründet. In Drenica und Metohija gab es dagegen keine Erfolge. Die Kolonisierung darf niemals nur mit Montenegrinern durchgeführt werden. Wir glauben nicht, daß sie wegen ihrer, den Hirten eigenen, Trägheit etwa ein schlechtes Kolonisationselement wären. Diese Trägheit tritt nur in der ersten Generation auf. Die zweite Generation ist ganz anders, sie ist aktiver und praktischer. Petrovo Selo in Miroc an der Donau, das fortgeschrittenste Dorf in Krajina, ist nur von Montenegrinern bewohnt. Und heute kann man in Serbien Tausende fortgeschrittene Wirtschaften finden, insbesondere in Toplica und Kosanica, die die mit den fortgeschrittensten Elementen vermischten Montenegriner der ersten Generation geschaffen haben. Das gilt insbesondere für Metohija, wo das direkte sich Stützen auf die alten Städten die Möglichkeit schuf, die alten Sitten und Bräuche zu bewahren. Es genügt, nach Pec zu gehen, einen Blick in die Kaffeehäuser zu werfen, um sich davon zu überzeugen. Deshalb hatte die Kolonisation in ganz Metohija wenig Erfolg. Man muß zugeben, daß sich diese Kolonien schlecht eingerichtet hatten, auf unfruchtbarem von Gestrüpp gerodeten Boden und fast gänzlich ohne die erforderlichen landwirtschaftlichen Geräte. Doch gerade sie hätte man mehr unterstützen müssen als andere, da sie mit dem ärmsten montenegrinischen Element kolonisiert sind.
    4. Der Hauptgrund des Mißerfolgs unserer Kolonisation in diesen Gebieten war zweifellos die Tatsache, daß der beste Boden in den Händen der Albaner blieb. Der einzig mögliche Weg der Massenkolonisation unseres Elements in diesen Gebieten hätte darin bestanden, den Albanern den Boden wegzunehmen. Nach dem Krieg, in der Zeit der Rebellion und der Aktionen der Komitaschis wäre das leicht zu realisieren gewesen, wenn man einen Teil der Albaner nach Albanien verjagt hätte, wenn man die von ihnen geraubten Weiden nicht legitimiert, sondern gekauft hätte. Erneut sehen wir uns veranlaßt, an dieser Stelle zu dem groben Fehler unseres Nachkriegskonzepts über das Bodenrecht zurückzukommen. Anstatt das eigene Konzept der Albaner, hinsichtlich des von ihnen geraubten Bodens auszunutzen, kam es vor, daß sie über einen Grundbuchauszug aus der Türkei verfügten. Und wenn, ohnehin nur für gekauften Boden, legitimierten wir den ganzen Bodenraub nicht nur zu unserem nationalen und staatlichen Schaden, wir brachten den Albanern auch, was noch schlimmer ist, die Ideen Westeuropas über den Besitz von Privateigentum bei. Vorher hatten sie keine Ahnung von diesen Ideen. Auf diese Weise gaben wir selbst ihnen diese Waffe in die Hand, mit der sie sich verteidigen werden. Und sie werden die besten Böden behalten und uns die Nationalisierung eines der wichtigsten Gebiete zu unseren Gunsten unmöglich machen.
    Aus allem, was oben gesagt wurde, geht hervor, daß die bisherigen Methoden unserer Kolonisationspolitik im Süden nicht jene Ergebnisse gezeigt haben, die eigentlich erreicht werden müßten, und die sich uns nunmehr als großes staatliches Erfordernis aufzwingen. Diese Methoden haben wir nicht um der Kritik willen kritisiert, sondern vielmehr deshalb, um auf Grundlage der Erfahrung die richtigen Wege zur Lösung dieser Frage zu finden.
    Probleme der Kolonisation der südlichen Gebiete
    Wenn man den ersten Teil dieser Arbeit durchliest, stellt man sogleich fest, daß im Rahmen der Erörterung der Kolonisationsfragen hinsichtlich der Südregion die Rede hauptsächlich auf jene Gebiete kommt, die nördlich und südlich der Sar Planina liegen. Das ist kein Zufall. Dieser albanische Blick rund um die Sar Planina hat große national- staatliche und strategische Bedeutung für unseren Staat. Wir haben bereits auf die Entstehungsart und die Bedeutung fester Verbindungen zwischen den Gebieten rund um das Vardar- Tal und unseren alten Gebieten hingewiesen. Die größte Kraft der serbischen Expansion hat sich seit der Entstehung des ersten serbischen Staates und später schon seit dem 9. Jahrhundert, stets auf die Kontinuität dieser Expansion gestützt sowie auf die Expansion der alten Gebiete Rakas in alle Richtungen, also auch nach Süden. Doch diese Kontinuität wurde von den Albanern unterbrochen; solange die alte kontinuierliche Verbindung zwischen Serbien, Montenegro und Mazedonien nicht wiederhergestellt ist, und zwar vom Drin bis zur Südmorava, können wir des Besitzes dieses Gebiets nicht sicher sein. Vom ethnischen Standpunkt aus werden sich die Mazedonier uns nur dann vollständig annähern, wenn sie eine wahre ethnische Unterstützung im serbischen Mutterland haben, die es bis heute nicht gibt. Sie werden sie nur durch die Zerschlagung des albanischen Blocks gewinnen können. Der albanische Block nimmt vom militärisch- strategischen Standpunkt aus eine der bedeutendsten Positionen in unserem Land ein, wo die balkanischen Flüsse Richtung Adria, Schwarzes Meer und Ägäis ihren Ausgangspunkt haben. Das Bewahren dieser strategischen Position entscheidet in hohem Maße über das Schicksal des Zentralbalkan, insbesondere über das Schicksal der wichtigsten balkanischen Verkehrsverbindung Morava- Vardar. Es ist kein Zufall, daß die Entscheidungsschlachten über das Schicksal des Balkan häufig hier stattgefunden haben (Nemanjiden gegen Griechen, Serben gegen Türken 1389, Ungarn gegen Türken 1446). Im 20. Jahrhundert wird man nur jenes Land sichern können, das vom eigenen autochthonen Volk bewohnt wird. Deshalb ist es eine dringende Aufgabe für uns alle, diese dermaßen wichtigen strategischen Positionen keinesfalls aufzugeben, es auf keinem Fall dem fremden und feindlichen Element zu überlassen. Erst recht, solange dieses Element die Unterstützung eines Nationalstaates desselben Stammes genießt. Dieser Staat ist vorläufig ohnmächtig, doch auch als solcher ist er ein Stützpunkt des italienischen Imperialismus geworden, durch den letzterer in das Herz unseres Staates einzudringen beabsichtigt. Gegen dieses Eindringen ist unser Element das sicherste Mittel, das wünschen und verstehen wird, sein Eigentum und den eigenen Staat zu verteidigen.
    Weiter: Neben diesem Block, bestehend aus 18 Bezirken leben die Albaner und die anderen nationalen Minderheiten über die südlichen Gebiete versprengt und sind daher keine Gefahr für unser nationales und staatliches Leben. Die Gebiete um die Sar Planina zu nationalisieren würde bedeuten, jeden Irredentismus für immer zu begraben und die Macht in diesen Gebieten für immer zu sichern.
    Die Umsiedlung vom Norden in die von Mazedoniern bewohnten Gebiete muß verringert werden. In diesen Gebieten ist der Boden knapp, es sind passive Gebiete und infolgedessen sensibel gegenüber den aus dem Norden kommenden Kolonisten. Erst recht, weil sie in solchen Handlungen Albanien stützt, wird ihr Nationalstolz geweckt. Wenn wir nicht in der erforderlichen Zeit die Rechnung mit ihnen begleichen, werden wir es in 20 bis 30 Jahren mit einem schrecklichen Irredentismus zu tun haben, dessen Spuren schon heute unweigerlich zutage treten und der unser ganzes Territorium im Süden in Frage stellen wird.
    Das internationale Problem der Kolonisation
    Wenn wir von dem Standpunkt ausgehen, daß die schrittweise Verdrängung der Albaner durch unsere schrittweise Kolonisation wirkungslos ist, bleibt uns nur ein einziger Weg, die Massenvertreibung. In diesem Fall haben wir zwei Staaten vor Augen, Albanien und Türkei.
    Albanien mit seiner spärlichen Bevölkerung, mit seinen zahlreichen noch nicht trockengelegten Sümpfen und unfruchtbaren noch nicht erschlossenen Tälern dürfte in der Lage sein, einige Hunderttausend Albaner aus unserem Land aufzunehmen. Die moderne Türkei mit ihren großen noch unbewohnten und unbearbeiteten Flächen in Kleinasien und Kurdistan bietet nahezu unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten für die innere Kolonisation. Trotz aller Anstrengungen von Qemal Atatürk haben es die Türken noch nicht vermocht, das durch die Umsiedlung der Griechen aus Kleinasien nach Griechenland und eines Teils Kurden nach Persien entstandene Bevölkerungsdefizit auszugleichen. Eben deshalb bestehen die besten Chancen, den größten Teil unserer Albaner, die wir vertreiben wollen, dorthin zu schicken. Zuvor betonen wir, daß wir uns bei unseren diplomatischen Vorstößen nicht allein auf Ankara beschränken dürfen: wir müssen vielmehr alle Mittel ausschöpfen, um Tirana davon zu überzeugen, einen Teil unserer Vertriebenen aufzunehmen. Ich glaube, daß diese Angelegenheit in Tirana auf Schwierigkeiten stoßen wird. Hier würde es Italien sein, das diese Angelegenheit behindern würde, doch spielt Geld in Tirana eine große Rolle. Im Rahmen der Gespräche um diese Frage muß die albanische Regierung davon in Kenntnis gesetzt werden, daß wir uns bei der definitiven Lösung dieser Frage durch nichts aufhalten lassen werden. Zugleich müssen wir sie über Subventionen für die Kolonisation unterrichten, die keiner Kontrolle unterliegen. Eventuell können einflußreiche Leute über geheime Kanäle in Tirana materiell dazu veranlaßt werden, in dieser Angelegenheit keinen Widerstand zu leisten.
    Wie wir gehört haben, ist die Türkei einverstanden, anfangs rund 200.000 unserer Vertriebenen unter der Bedingung aufzunehmen, daß es sich dabei um Albaner handelt, was für uns am vorteilhaftesten ist. Den Wunsch der Türkei, zuvor eine Umsiedlungskonvention abzuschließen, sollten wir voll und ganz akzeptieren. Hinsichtlich der Umsiedlung sollten wir die Konventionen durcharbeiten, die sie in den letzten Jahren über diese Frage mit Griechenland, Rumänien und Bulgarien abgeschlossen hat, wobei wir zwei Dingen Beachtung schenken sollten: man sollte von ihr verlangen, daß sie eine möglichst große Quote akzeptiert, während man ihr von der finanziellen Seite her eine möglichst große Unterstützung gewähren sollte, insbesondere für die Regelung eines möglichst schnellen Transports. Zweifellos wird dieses Problem einige internationale Unruhe hervorrufen, was in solchen Fällen unvermeidlich ist. Immer wenn in den letzten Jahrhunderten solche Handlungen auf dem Balkan stattgefunden haben, hat sich eine Macht gefunden, die dagegen protestiert hat, weil sie nicht mit ihren Interessen übereinstimmten. In diesem Fall könnten es Albanien und Italien sein. Was Albanien anbelangt, haben wir schon betont, daß man für den Abschluß einer Konvention mit ihm über dieses Problem sorgen muß. Angenommen, wir erreichten dieses Ziel nicht, sollten wir zumindest anstreben, daß es sich mit der Vertreibung in die Türkei abfindet. Wir wiederholen, daß in Tirana Verhandlungsgeschick sowie angemessen eingesetzte Geldmittel eine entscheidende Rolle bei dieser Frage spielen können. Die Weltöffentlichkeit wird sich ein wenig beunruhigen, insbesondere die von Italien finanzierte. Nichtsdestoweniger hat sich die Weltöffentlichkeit an weit Schlimmeres gewöhnt und ist dermaßen mit Tagesfragen beschäftigt, daß sie sich von dieser Seite wohl kaum beunruhigen dürfte. Wenn Deutschland Zehntausende von Juden vertreiben und Rußland Millionen von Menschen von einem Teil des Kontinents zum anderen verlegen konnte, so wird die Vertreibung von einigen Hunderttausend Albanern schon nicht zum Ausbruch eines Weltkrieges führen. Doch die kompetenten entscheidenden Gremien sollten wissen was sie wollen: sie müssen die Vertreibung beharrlich durchführen, wobei sie mögliche internationale Hindernisse nicht zu beachten brauchen. Zweifellos wird Italien am meisten Schwierigkeiten machen, aber es ist zu sehr mit seinen Problemen hinsichtlich Abessinien und Österreich beschäftigt, als daß es wagen könnte, in seinem Widerstand zu weit zu gehen. Um die Wahrheit zu sagen, besteht die größte Gefahr darin, daß sich unsere großen Verbündeten, Frankreich und England, in diese Sache einmischen könnten. Mit Kaltblütigkeit und Entschlossenheit muß ihnen geantwortet werden, daß die Sicherheit der Morava- Vardar- Linie in ihrem Interesse liegt, was sich auch im letzten großen Krieg zeigte. Sie wird erst dann für uns und für sie noch sicherer werden, wenn wir diese Gebiete rund um die Sar Planina und in Kosovo vom ethnischen her vollständig beherrschen werden.
    Die Vertreibungsmethode
    Wir haben schon betont, daß für uns nur die Massenvertreibung der Albaner aus ihrem Dreieck wirkungsvoll ist. Die erste Bedingung für eine Massenvertreibung ist die Erzeugung einer geeigneten Psychose; sie kann auf vielerlei Art und Weise erzeugt werden.
    Bekanntlich unterwerfen sich die mohammedanischen Massen im allgemeinen sehr schnell einem Einfluß, insbesondere einem religiösen; sie sind abergläubisch und fanatisch. Von daher ist vor allem erforderlich, daß wir, um die Albaner vertreiben zu können, ihren Klerus und die einflußreichen Leuten durch Geld oder Drohungen auf unsere Seite ziehen. Man muß so schnell wie möglich Agitatoren finden, die für die Vertreibung Propaganda machen; es wäre natürlich gut, wenn die Türkei selbst uns welche überließe. Sie müssen die Schönheit der neuen Gegenden in der Türkei, das leichte und behagliche Leben beschreiben, religiösen Fanatismus in den Massen schüren und den türkischen Nationalstolz wecken. Unsere Presse kann kolossale Dienste leisten, indem sie die bequemen Umsiedlungen der Türken aus Dobrudscha und ihre gute Stabilisierung in den neuen Gegenden beschreibt. Mit diesen Beschreibungen würden bei unseren albanischen Massen die nötigen Vorbedingungen für die Vertreibung geschaffen werden.
    Ein anderes Mittel wäre der Zwang durch den Staatsapparat. Er muß die Gesetze bis ins letzte ausschöpfen, so daß es den Albanern unerträglich wird, bei uns zu bleiben: Geldstrafen, Gefängnis, rücksichtslose Anwendung aller polizeilichen Möglichkeiten, etwa Verurteilung des Schmuggels, des Forstfrevels, Bestrafung von Personen, die Schäden in den Landwirtschaft verursachen oder Hunde frei herumstreunen lassen, Zwangsverschickung und überhaupt jedes Mittel, das eine erfahrene Polizei zu erfinden imstande ist. Wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen: Nichtanerkennung der alten Grundbuchauszüge; die Katasterämter in diesen Gebieten müssen sofort rücksichtslos die Abgaben und alle privaten und öffentlichen Schulden eintreiben, Einziehung des staatlichen und kommunalen Weidelands, Außerkraftsetzung von Konzessionen und Berufsverbote, Entlassung aus staatlichen, privaten und kommunalen Arbeitsstellen usw. Dies würde den Vertreibungsprozeß beschleunigen. Sanitäre Maßnahmen: gewaltsame Anwendung aller Anordnungen auch innerhalb der Häuser, Zerstörung der Mauern und Zäune um die Häuser, rigorose Anwendung der Veterinären Maßnahmen, mit dem Ziel, den Viehhandel zu unterbinden usw. Auch hier kann wirkungsvoll und praktisch vorgegangen werden. Wenn die Rede auf die Religion kommt, sind die Albaner überaus empfindlich, deshalb muß man hier scharf zuschlagen. Dies kann durch schlechte Behandlung der Kleriker erzielt werden, durch Verwüstung der Friedhöfe, durch das Verbot der Polygamie und insbesondere durch die rücksichtslose Anwendung der Grundschulpflicht für Mädchen überall dort, wo sich Grundschulen befinden.
    Auch private Initiativen können in dieser Hinsicht sehr hilfreich sein. Man muß an die Kolonisten, wenn nötig, Waffen ausgeben. In diesen Gebieten muß die alte Bandentätigkeit wiederbelebt werden: man muß ihnen heimlich Unterstützung zukommen lassen. Insbesondere sollte man eine wahre Flut von Montenegrinern von den Bergweiden herunterjagen, damit sie in breitem Maßstab Konflikte mit den Albanern in Metohija heraufbeschwören. Dieser Konflikt muß durch uns ergebene Leute vorbereitet, geschürt und hochgeputscht werden, was leicht sein dürfte, da sich die Albaner tatsächlich erhoben haben. Während die Ereignisse als Stammeskonflikt dargestellt werden müssen; wenn nötig, kann man ihnen ökonomischen Charakter verleihen. Schließlich und endlich kann man auch lokale Unruhen schüren, die dann mit wirkungsvollsten Mittel auf blutige Weise unterdrückt werden müßten, doch nicht so sehr mit der Armee als vielmehr mit Kolonisten, montenegrinischen Stämmen und Banden.
    Es bleibt noch ein Mittel, das Serbien auf höchst praktische Weise nach 1878 angewandt hat, wobei es im geheimen albanische Dörfer und Stadtviertel anzünden ließ.
    Die Organisierung der Vertreibung
    Nach der beigelegten Karte müssen folgende Bezirke umgesiedelt werden: Ober- debar, Unterpolog, Oberpolog, Sar Planina, Drenica, Savica, Vuçiterna, Lab, Gracanica, Nerodimja, Djakovica, Gora, Podgor, Podrimja, Pec, Istok, Gnjilane und Kaçanik. Von diesen Bezirken, die für uns gegenwärtig den albanischen Keil darstellen, sind die wichtigsten: Pec, Djakovica, Podrimja, Gora, Podgor, Sar, Istok und Drenica. Im Norden der Sar Planina und danach Oberdebar, die beiden Polog-Bezirke südlich der Sar Planina. Dies sind die Grenzbezirke; sie müssen um jeden Preis umgesiedelt werden. Die Bezirke im Landesinneren, etwa Kaçanik, Gnjilane, Nerodimja, Gracanica, Lab, Vuciterna müssen möglichst geschwächt werden, insbesondere Kaçanik und Lab. Während die anderen schrittweise und systematisch kolonisiert werden müssen; was zu verwirklichen ist. Die obenerwähnten Mittel müssen insbesondere in den Grenzbezirken zur Anwendung kommen, wenn wir wünschen, daß sie umgesiedelt werden sollen.
    Bei der Vertreibung sollte man sich folgende Dinge vor Augen halten: Zunächst wäre es angebracht, sich der Vertreibung der Bauern zuzuwenden, danach erst sind die Stadtbewohner an der Reihe. Die Dorfbewohner sind zusammenhängender; deshalb sind sie auch gefährlicher. Danach sollte man nicht in den Fehler verfallen, nur die Armen zu vertreiben: das Rückgrat eines jeden Volkes sind die mittleren und reichen Schichten. Auch sie müssen verfolgt und vertrieben werden. Die Armen, die keine Unterstützung bei den wirtschaftlich unabhängigen Landsleuten mehr haben, beugen sich schnell. Dies ist eine Frage von großer Bedeutung die ich betone, weil sie eine der wichtigsten Ursachen dafür ist, daß unsere Kolonisation im Süden nicht den erforderlichen Erfolg gebracht hat, weil zwar die Armen vertrieben wurden, die Reichen aber blieben, und wir auf diese Weise immer noch am Anfang stehen, weil wir sehr wenig Grund und Boden für die Niederlassung unserer Kolonisation gewonnen haben. Während der Erzeugung der Vertreibungspsychose muß alles unternommen werden, daß ganze Dörfer abziehen, wenigstens aber ganze Familien. Unter allen Umständen muß verhindert werden, daß nur ein Teil der Familie vertrieben wird, der andere hingegen bleibt. Unser Staat wird nicht Millionen ausgeben, um den Albanern das Leben zu erleichtern, sondern um sich eine möglichst große Zahl von ihnen vom Hals zu schaffen. Deshalb muß unbedingt verhindert werden, daß die Albaner, die umsiedeln, ihre Grundstücke an jene verkaufen, die hierbleiben. Im Zusammenhang damit müssen wir die Umsiedlung von Einzelpersonen mit der Umsiedlung ganzer Dörfer verbinden; falls sie wünschen, sollten sie Erleichterungen während des Umsiedlungsprozesses haben.
    Sobald sie einverstanden sind, umzusiedeln, muß man ihnen allseitige Hilfe zukommen lassen. Man muß den Verwaltungsvorgang vereinfachen, man muß sogleich ihren Besitz aufkaufen, man sollte ihnen bei allerlei Formalitäten zuvorkommend dienen. Reisedokumente aushändigen, ihnen helfen, bis zum ersten Bahnhof zu kommen, indem man ihnen Züge bis Saloniki zur Verfügung stellt, und von dort sogleich per Schiff nach Asien verfrachten. Es ist von großer Bedeutung, daß die Reisen leicht, bequem und kostenlos sind. Die Zugfahrt sollte nach Möglichkeit gratis sein, man sollte ihnen zugleich auch mit Nahrungsmitteln unter die Arme greifen, denn davon hängt stark ab ob sie in Massen umsiedeln oder nicht. Die Angst vor Schwierigkeiten während der Reise ist das Haupthindernis. Deshalb ist es erforderlich, sich stark dafür zu machen, daß alle Reiseangelegenheiten rasch und energisch geklärt werden. Man muß vor allem dafür sorgen, daß sie möglichst wenig Scherereien wegen der Reise haben, weil sich die einfachen Leute an Schwierigkeiten orientieren; deshalb wäre es vorteilhaft, das Transportsystem des großen Reisebüros zu untersuchen und zu verwenden. Der Umsiedler soll von einer Hand zu anderer gehen, er soll auf keinen Fall die Last dieser Bewegung spüren. Nur auf diese Weise kann die albanische Auswanderungswelle erzeugt werden, die unseren Süden von den Albanern entvölkern wird.
    Der Bevölkerungsprozeß der ausgesiedelten Gebiete
    Das Problem der Errichtung von Kolonien in den ausgesiedelten Gebieten ist nicht kleiner als das Problem der Vertreibung der Albaner.
    Die erste Frage, die sich aufdrängt, ist: Wer soll sich dort niederlassen? Am natürlichsten wäre, wenn sich dort unser Element aus den passiven Gebiete niederließe, vor allem Einwohner aus Montenegro, Herzegowina, Licko Polje und Krajina. Die Montenegriner sind aus vielen Gründen am geeignetsten. Metohija, Drenica und Kosovo sind die natürlichsten Stellen, denen sie ohnehin aus ihren verarmten Bergregionen zuströmen. Das Bevölkerungswachstum in Montenegro hat Armut mit sich gebracht, was in der letzten Zeit ständig sozialpolitische und für die Staatsmacht ungünstige Bewegungen hervorgerufen hat, die, was Ruhe und Ordnung in der Zukunft betrifft, ziemlich gefährlich für uns sind. Es lohnt sich nicht, ihnen Mais und Renten zu geben. Die einzige Lösung ist, sie den fruchtbaren Gebieten von Metohija, Drenica und Kosovo zuzuführen. Denn sie sind, was Mentalität und Temperament anbelangt, den Albanern ziemlich ähnlich. Die Montenegriner sind die geeignetste Waffe, um die Albaner zu bezwingen. In erster Linie sollten sie in den Gegenden nördlich der Sar Planina eingesetzt werden, doch zusätzlich sollte man auch Einwohner aus Licko Polje und Krajina sowie Serben aus Cacak, Uzice und Toplica dort ansiedeln. Das ist notwendig, um bei ihnen mehr Arbeits- und Organisationsfertigkeiten zu schaffen, um ihre, den Bergbewohnern eigene Denkweise, durch Vermischung und Einheiratung aus verschiedenen dinarischen Gegenden umzuwandeln, so daß ein neuer Typ von Montenegrinern erzeugt werden kann, der weniger ortsverbunden ist und insgesamt serbisch wird.
    Den südserbischen Gastarbeitern, südlich der Sar Planina, müssen geeignete Bedingungen geschaffen werden, daß sie imstande sind, den fruchtbaren Boden für sich in Beschlag zu nehmen. Sie sind ehrliche und fleißige Menschen, die ihr ganzes Leben lang diesem Staat dankbar sein werden, vorausgesetzt, ihnen werden angenehme Bedingungen für das Dorfleben geschaffen. Im allgemeinen hat das Dorf der Südserben das Recht, mehr Fürsorge und Beachtung zu verlangen als wir ihm heute widmen. Die Kolonisation dieser Armen nach Ober- und Unterpolog sowie nach Debar, die Verlegung ihrer Weidegebiete in das Land der Albaner wird dafür sorgen, daß sie unseren Staat als den ihren empfinden und infolgedessen verstehen, seine Grenzen zu verteidigen.
    Außer diesen können auch Serben aus Vranje, Leskovac, Pirot und Vlasotince, insbesondere aus den passiven Bergdörfern, südlich der Sar Planina und der Crna Gora bei Skopje angesiedelt werden. Ich wiederholen noch einmal, daß sich die Dinariker nicht im Südosten des Crna Gora bei Skopje und der Sar Planina niederlassen dürfen.
    Während der Kolonisierung der, von den Albanern zurückgelassenen Dörfer, darf man sich nicht in bürokratischer Dickfelligkeit verzetteln. Die erste Handlung ist die sofortige Aushändigung der Grundbuchauszüge an die Kolonisten für den Boden, auf dem sie sich niederlassen. Einer der wichtigsten Ursachen für den Mißerfolg unserer bisherigen Kolonisation war die, daß der Kolonist nicht das Gefühl hatte, sich des Bodens, auf dem er sich niedergelassen hatte, sicher zu sein, eben weil er nicht sofort einen Grundbuchauszug bekam und auf diese Weise den Schikanen gewissenloser Angestellter und Politiker ausgeliefert war. Der Bauer fühlt sich nur dann des Bodens, den er besitzt, sicher, wenn er weiß, daß er unter keinen Umständen mehr vertrieben werden kann. Deshalb muß ihm sofort eine entsprechende Garantie gegeben werden. Doch zugleich ist es nicht ohne Risiko, den Kolonisten die vollen Bodennutzungsrechte zu gewähren. Im Prinzip haben die Wirtschaften der Kolonisten ihre staatliche und nationale Mission und derjenige, der sie übernommen hat, muß diese Mission auch erfüllen. Deshalb darf er nicht unbeschränkt über diesen Besitz disponieren. Denn unter ihnen gibt es viele verschiedene auch proletarisierte Menschen aus dem Dorf, die das Gefühl für Boden oder Vieh verloren haben, die sich erst an die Landwirtschaft gewöhnen müssen; sie müssen gesetzlich an den Boden gebunden werden, damit sie anfangen, die neuen Gebiete und Höfe zu lieben oder zumindest ihre Kinder, wenn es ersteren nicht gelingt. Deshalb muß den Kolonisten für mindestens 30 Jahre verboten werden, frei über ihren Boden zu verfügen, vor allem deshalb, weil sie sofort die Grundbuchauszüge ausgehändigt bekommen. Unserem Recht zufolge genießt die Frau bei uns nicht das Recht, Boden zu erben. Um den Zerstückelung des kleinen Bodens zu verhüten, müssen die Frauen von der Erbschaft kolonisierten Bodens ausgeschlossen werden, außer in Fällen, wenn der Kolonist keine männliche Nachkommen hat oder beabsichtigt, einen Schwiegersohn ins Haus zu holen. Die Besitzungen, die den Kolonisten bisher überlassen wurden, sind klein gewesen. Wenn wir uns die extensive Bodenbearbeitung vor Augen halten, das Fallen der landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugerpreise, die große Kinderzahl bei den Kolonisten, so ist eine Wirtschaft von fünf bis zehn Hektar nicht in der Lage dem Kolonisten Voraussetzungen für eine gesicherte wirtschaftliche Entwicklung zu geben.
    Es ist günstiger, wenn sich in einem Gebiet eine kleinere Zahl Kolonisten mit besseren Entwicklungsbedingungen niederläßt als eine große Anzahl halbproletarischer Bauern. Das letztere ist ebenso eine der wichtigsten Ursachen für den Mißerfolg unserer bisherigen Kolonisation im Süden und Norden.
    Selten verfügt ein Volk unter derartig schwierigen Bedingungen über ein dermaßen anpassungsfähiges Element für die Kolonisation wie wir. Und auch die geringen Erfolge, die wir bei der Kolonisation zu verzeichnen haben, wurden wegen dieser Kolonisationsqualitäten unserer Rasse erzielt. Allein unser Bauer, verstreut über Wälder und Brachland, von einer Gegend in die andere ziehend, war in der Lage, unter solch schwierigen Umständen zu leben. Zu welchen Leistungen wäre er erst imstande gewesen, wenn der Staat ihm das gegeben hätte, was eigentlich seine Pflicht gewesen wäre.
    Am 10. Februar 1865 erließ die Regierung Knjaz Mihailo das "Gesetz über die Kolonisation Serbiens mit Fremden". Diesem Gesetz zufolge gab die serbische Regierung den armen Kolonisten der Nachbarländer 3 Jutra (Jutra=0.6 Hektar) Ackerland und 3 Jutra Brachland, ein Haus, zwei Ochsen, ein Fuhrwerk, zwei Ziegen oder Schafe, eine Sau, die erforderlichen Arbeitsgeräte und 120 Groschen bar auf die Hand. Darüber hinaus selbstverständlich Mais als Nahrung bis zur ersten Ernte. Jede zweite Familie erhielt einen Pflug. Die bewegliche und unbewegliche Habe wurde den Kolonisten zur Nutzung überlassen, wobei sie allerdings bis zu 15 Jahre lang nicht verkaufen durften. Nach dieser Frist ging sie in ihr Eigentum über. Für fünf Jahre wurden die Kolonisten von sämtlichen Abgaben gegenüber den Staat befreit; für zehn Jahre waren sie von der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht in der regulären Armee bzw. für fünf Jahre vom Dienst in den militärischen Volkseinheiten befreit. Das Echo von allen Seiten war dargestellt, daß sich in einigen Monaten alle Orte füllten und damals mehr kolonisiert wurde, als wir in einigen Jahren nach dem Krieg bewerkstelligen konnten. Wenn der Staat den Kolonisten diese Vergünstigungen nach 1918 eingeräumt hätte, wäre unsere Lage sowohl in der Vojvodina als auch in Südserbien anders. Auf diese Weise müssen wir in Zukunft handeln, wenn wir Erfolg haben wollen.
    Lehrreich ist auch die Kolonisationsart von Toplica und Kosanica, nach 1876, als aus diesen Gebieten Albaner umgesiedelt wurden. Ein Gesetz vom 3. Januar 1880 regelte die Kolonisationsart dieser Gebiete. Am 3. Februar desselben Jahres billigte die Volksskupschtina ein Gesetz über die Regulierung der Agrarverhältnisse nach dem Prinzip "den Boden dem Bauern". Ohne irgendeine Schwankung nahm Serbien seine erste ausländische Anleihe auf, um der Türkei den zur Verfügung gestellten Boden zu bezahlen. Es schuf weder ein agrar Reformministerium, noch einen kostspieligen Apparat für die Frage der Kolonisation, sondern vollzog alles einfach und auf praktische Weise. Die Polizeiorgane gaben all jenen Boden, die arbeiten wollten. Es kamen Einwohner aus Montenegro, Sjenica, Kosovo, Pec usw., und 30 Jahre nach 1878 gaben Toplica und Kosanica einstmals berüchtigte albanische Gebiete, Serbien in den Kriegen 1912 bis 1918 das beste Regiment, das 11 Eiserne Regiment. Toplica und Kosanica haben mit dem Blut ihrer Söhne jene zehn Millionen Dinar bezahlt und über bezahlt, die Serbien einstmals für seine Kolonisation verausgabt hatte.
    Nur wenn wir dieses Beispiel beherzigen, nur wenn wir verstehen was verlangt wird, nur wenn wir weder Geld noch Blut scheuen, wird unser Staat aus Kosovo und Metohija ein Neu- Toplica schaffen können.
    Also müssen wir den Kolonisten innerhalb einiger Jahre alle Lebensbedingungen sichern, wenn wir wollen, daß sie dort bleiben. Mitleidlos müssen alle Spekulationen mit den Häusern und dem Boden der ausgesiedelten Albaner erstickt werden. Der Staat muß sich das uneingeschränkte Recht vorbehalten, über die bewegliche und unbewegliche Habe der Vertriebenen zu disponieren: sofort nach ihrer Entfernung müssen sich dort Kolonisten niederlassen. Dafür muß schon deshalb gesorgt werden, da es nur selten passieren dürfte, daß ein ganzes Dorf auf einmal umgesiedelt wird. In diese Dörfer müssen zuerst Montenegriner gebracht werden, als arrogante, aufbrausende und gnadenlose Menschen, die mit ihrem Benehmen die gebliebenen Albaner zwingen werden umzusiedeln. Danach können auch Kolonisten aus anderen Gegenden geholt werden.
    In diesem Referat wird nur das Problem der Kolonisation Südserbiens behandelt. Nicht weniger wichtig für uns ist das Problem Vojvodina, insbesondere das Problem des ungarischen Dreiecks in Backa - Senta, Kula und Backa Topola. Dieses Dreieck in der Vojvodina zu zerschlagen, würde dasselbe bedeuten wie die Zerschlagung des albanischen Blocks um die Sar Planina. Nach der Zerstreuung dieser Großgrundbesitzer bleiben dort einige Zehntausend ungarische Landarbeiter, die zum größten Teil auf dem serbischen und deutschen Mittelbauer der Vojvodina lasten. Diese ungarischen Arbeiter und Kleineigentümer, und sogar die deutschen, müssen teilweise in den Süden überführt werden, weil sie in Backa, an der Grenze mit Ungarn, eine Gefahr darstellen, vor allem, da die Serben in Backa nur 25 Prozent der Bevölkerung ausmachen. Indem sie in Südserbien ihr Eigentum vor Albanien schützen, werden sie sich in gute Bürger verwandeln, werden sie mit unseren Massen verschmelzen, und ihnen, was sehr wichtig ist, als Vorbild bei der fortgeschrittenen Feldarbeit dienen, denn sie sind kulturell schon weiter und auf einen höheren Niveau als die Unsrigen. In besonderer Weise betonen wir, daß nicht die Serben der Vojvodina in den Süden zur Kolonisation geholt werden dürfen. In der Vojvodina gibt es noch Boden zur Kolonisation, deshalb muß man ihnen dort Boden geben. Wir betonen ebenso, daß in den Jahren 1928 bis 1929 bei den Ungarn und Deutschen der Vojvodina eine Bewegung zu verzeichnen war, nach Südserbien umzusiedeln, doch unsere Öffentlichkeit, die nicht auf der Höhe der Probleme stand, erhob sich gegen sie und erstickte diese Bewegung im Keim. Ein weiterer Verstoß in dieser Richtung muß verhindert werden; unsere öffentliche Meinung muß instruiert werden, die Umsiedlung der Ungarn und Deutschen aus der Vojvodina, insbesondere von Backa in den Süden, zu unterstützen.
    Die Kolonisationstechnik
    Von besonderer Bedeutung für die Lösung der diskutierten Frage ist die Existenz eines Apparats, der alle Arbeiten leiten soll. Auf der schlechten Arbeit des Apparats, der bis jetzt unsere Kolonisationspolitik umgesetzt hat, beruht ein guter Teil unserer bisherigen Mißerfolge. Damit dies in Zukunft vermieden wird, muß eine Neuorganisierung durchgeführt werden.
    Keine andere Frage verlangt soviel Kontinuität bei der Umsetzung wie die Kolonisation. Wir haben betont, daß eine der wichtigsten Ursachen für den Mißerfolg unserer Kolonisation im Norden wie im Süden die inkonsequente Arbeit und die Änderung der Politik je nach Regierungswechsel war. Um dies in Zukunft zu vermeiden, muß die Kolonisation dem Generalstab anvertraut werden, einfach aus Verteidigungsgründen. Unsere Armee ist interessiert, daß sich an der Grenzen, insbesondere an den heiklen Grenzen, ihre eigenen Elemente niederlassen. Deshalb wird sie nichts unversucht lassen, durch eine möglichst effektive Kolonisation die Grenzen zu sichern. Der Generalstab als primäre Einrichtung der Verteidigung der nationalen Interessen kann unserer ganzen Kolonisationspolitik unschätzbare Dienste erweisen. Der Generalstab wird die Umsetzung der Kolonisationspolitik aufs beste vor privaten Vermittlern, Gewinnsüchtigen und vor jedem äußeren Einfluß zu schützen wissen. Von Bedeutung ist auch die Tatsache, daß er es leichter haben wird, die Verantwortlichen von der Bedeutung der Frage zu überzeugen, um sie dazu zu bewegen, wirkungsvolle Entscheidungen zu treffen. Auch die Volksskupschtina wird ihm mehr Vertrauen schenken und wird ihm vor allem die nötigen Kredite bewilligen.
    Der Generalstab sollte die ganze Arbeit durch einen Staatsrat für Kolonisation leiten. Dieser Rat sollte gänzlich unabhängig sein und nur der Kontrolle des Generalstabschefs unterstehen; dieser Staatsrat sollte alle unsere Kolonisationsgremien unter sich haben. In diesen Rat müssen Repräsentanten einiger in dieser Frage engagierter Ministerien, Vertreter nationaler Gesellschaften, technischer Organisationen und wissenschaftlicher Institutionen eintreten. Der größte Fehler unserer Kolonisationspolitik bestand darin, daß das letzte Wort die unfähige Bürokratie hatte, die die Fragen stückweise und ohne die erforderlichen Untersuchungen löste. Rufen wir uns nur die Kolonisation unserer Wahlbürger aus Ungarn nach Ovce Polje oder der Emigranten aus Istrien und Gorizia, die sich um Demir- Kapi niedergelassen hatten, in Erinnerung. Deshalb ist eine organische Verbindung zwischen Staatsmacht, den Privatinitiativen und den wissenschaftlichen Institutionen in unserer Kolonisationspolitik erforderlich. Die Privatinitiativen können in vielen Richtungen wirken. Volkswehr, Terror- und Verbrecherbanden usw. können solche Handlungen gegen die Albaner unternehmen, für die es nicht opportun wäre, den Staat zu engagieren. Die Gesellschaften der Agronomen, Ärzte und Ingenieure, die Genossenschaften usw. könnten sehr gut mit ihren technischen Ratschlägen zur Lösung der zahlreichen Probleme beitragen, die während unseres Kolonisationsprozesses entstehen. Auch Kulturvereine, etwa der Bildungsverein Prosveta in Sarajevo, die serbische Literaturgesellschaft in Novi Sad, die Gesellschaft St. Sava in Belgrad usw. haben gleichfalls ihre Aufgaben bezüglich dieser Frage.
    Es besteht kein Zweifel, daß unsere hohen wissenschaftlichen Institutionen im Begriff sind, das Prestige zu verlieren, das sie einstmals genossen hatten. Der wichtigste Grund dafür ist, daß die Universität und die Akademie der Wissenschaften sich immer mehr vom realen Leben entfernen und die wichtigsten Aufgaben vernachlässigen, die sie in einem relativ rückständigen Land wie unserem haben: der Aneignung der wissenschaftlichen Waffen des 20. Jahrhunderts zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen. Viele Milliarden könnten in diesem Land eingespart werden, zahlreiche Fehler könnten in unserer Staatspolitik vermieden werden, etwa in der Kolonisationspolitik, wenn die Probleme möglichst früh von den besten kompetenten wissenschaftlichen Kräften ernsthaft und objektiv untersucht worden wären, bevor sie gelöst werden. Auch in unsere Kolonisationspolitik wurde mehr Ernsthaftigkeit, Kontinuität in der Arbeit und Effektivität bei der Umsetzung einfließen, wenn zunächst die Meinungen der Spezialisten und Wissenschaftler eingeholt würden. In erster Linie muß die Serbische Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften und die Universität Belgrad die Initiative für die Organisierung einer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung des ganzen Kolonisationsproblems bei uns ergreifen. Dies wäre ohne weiteres möglich. An der Universität haben wir Spezialisten für jede Frage bezüglich der Kolonisation. Die Universitätspädagogen und Akademiker sind unabhängig, die kaum einen äußeren politischen Einfluß unterworfen sind. Sie haben schon brauchbare Erfahrung in derartigen Angelegenheiten; ihre wissenschaftliche Aktivierung ist die Garantie für unsere Ziele. Deshalb müssen sie die Initiative ergreifen, um ein Kolonisationsinstitut zu gründen, dessen Aufgabe wäre, Kolonisationsfragen zu untersuchen. Die Staatsmacht ihrerseits sollte aus einigen Ministerien und sämtlichen Institutionen, die sich bislang mit dieser Frage befaßt haben, ein Sonderinstitut zusammenstellen, das "Kolonisationsinspektoriat".
    An der Spitze des Kolonisationsinspektoriats sollte ein Generalinspekteur stehen, ernannt per Dekret auf Vorschlag des Kriegsministers, des Generalstabschefs und des Ministerpräsidenten. Alle Arbeiten im Kolonisationsinstitut sowie im Kolonisationsinspektoriat sollten auf Anweisung und unter Aufsicht des Staatsrats erfolgen, der Generalinspekteur hingegen soll vom Generalstabschef abhängen.
    Das Kolonisationsinstitut sollte sich in Abteilungen aufgliedern: 1. Organisationsabteilung; 2. Bildung- und Kulturabteilung; 3. Finanzabteilung, 4. Landwirtschaftsabteilung; 5. Bauabteilung; 6. Hygieneabteilung usw. Die Abteilungen sollten in Verbindung mit den wissenschaftlichen, nationalen Bildung- und Kulturinstitutionen die Kolonisationsprobleme untersuchen und Direktiven vorbereiten, indem sie so unserer Kolonisationspolitik ein solides, durchgearbeitetes wissenschaftliches Material in die Hand geben, damit Entscheidungen gefällt werden können. An der Spitze dieser Institution sollten Mitglieder des Staatsrats stehen, zusammengesetzt aus Vertretern der Universität und der Akademie der Wissenschaften, sowie Vertretern der nationalen privaten Kultur- und Bildungsinstitutionen, die in diesem Rat gewählt bzw. ernannt werden sollen. Dabei sollte man dafür sorgen, daß nicht irgendwelche Leute genommen werden, sondern Menschen, die sich dieser großen Arbeit mit Liebe und Leidenschaft widmen.
    Die Leiter und die Angestellten des Instituts sind durch Ausschreibung auszuwählen. Das Institut soll dem Kolonisationsinspektorat wissenschaftlich ausgearbeitetes Material für die Umsetzung der Kolonisationspolitik liefern. Im Falle von grundlegenden Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen Kolonisationsinspektorat und Institut behält sich der Generalstabschef des entscheidende Wort vor.
    Das Kolonisationsinspektorat muß seine Exekutivorgane im ganzen Land haben, ausgestattet mit begeisterungsfähigen Leuten, die zu dieser Arbeit bereit sind, unabhängig davon, ob sie im Staatsdienst sind oder nicht. Deshalb müssen sie möglicherweise durch Ausschreibung ausgewählt und auf Vorschlag des Generalstabschefs ernannt werden, während kompromittierte und unfähige Beamte abzulehnen sind. Während der Arbeit sollen das Inspektorat und seine Organe, so weit als möglich, bürokratische Formalitäten vermeiden, und sich nur das eine vor Augen halten: die möglichst sofortige Vertreibung der Albaner und die Niederlassung unserer Kolonisten.
    Der Polizeiapparat wird eine überaus wichtige Rolle in dieser Angelegenheit spielen. Deshalb ist es erforderlich, die energischsten und loyalsten Beamten auszuwählen und dorthin zu schicken. Ihre Versetzung darf nur mit Zustimmung des Generalstabschefs erfolgen; für eine dermaßen schwierige Arbeit müssen sie aus geheimen Etatposten entlohnt werden. Es müssen strenge Maßnahmen gegen jeden von ihnen ergriffen werden, der sich auch nur die kleinste Unregelmäßigkeit zu Schulden kommen läßt. Für das ganze erwähnte Territorium von 18 Bezirken muß ein Sonderkomissar ernannt werden, der die Befehle des Staatsinspekteurs für Kolonisation durchführt. Den Bezirkspräfekten muß Sondervollmacht und entsprechende Instruktion erteilt werden. Unseren politischen Parteien muß auf unmißverständliche Weise gesagt werden, daß die Parteienrivalität während der Wahlen in diesen Bezirken kategorisch verboten ist, und daß den Abgeordneten jede Einmischung zugunsten der Albaner kategorisch verboten ist.
    Die Organisationstechnik der Vertreibung der Albaner und der Niederlassung unserer Kolonisten soll das staatliche Institut und das Kolonisationsinspektorat selbst ausarbeiten. Vielleicht wäre es nicht schlecht, neben diesen beiden offiziellen Institutionen auch eine Privatorganisation zu gründen, die sich auf die bestehenden Gesellschaften stützen soll und die Aufgabe hätte, bei der Umsetzung unserer Kolonisationspolitik zu helfen. Am besten wäre es, wenn diese Arbeit die Liga unserer Kultur- und Bildungsvereine übernehmen könnte. Sie sollte sich für die Koordinierung der Arbeit der Privatvereine mit der staatlichen Kolonisationspolitik kümmern und als Verbindungsstelle zwischen ihnen und dem Kolonisationsinstitut dienen.
    Die finanziellen Mittel
    So oft unsere Kolonisationspolitik wegen Mißerfolgen bei uns kritisiert worden ist, haben sich ihre Verfechter immer hinter den geringen finanziellen Mittel, die der Staat zur Verfügung gestellt hat, versteckt. Wir bestreiten gar nicht, daß dem in gewisser Weise so ist. Trotzdem wird man zugeben müssen, daß bei uns mehr für die Aufrechterhaltung des Apparats und für eine unrationelle Arbeit, als für die Kolonisation selbst ausgegeben worden ist. Nichtsdestoweniger, wenn der Staat nicht das geleistet hat, was seine Pflicht war, muß man sich einmal fragen, was seine primären und was seine sekundären Interessen sind. Zu den primären Interessen gehört zweifellos auch die Aufgabe des Staates, durch Kolonisation der unsicheren nationalen Gebiete mit dem eigenen Element die Erhaltung eben dieser Gebiete zu gewährleisten. Alle anderen Aufgaben und Verpflichtungen stehen dahinter zurück. Man kann und muß für diese Frage Geld auftreiben. Wir haben schon den Fall Serbiens während der Kolonisation von Toplica und Kosanica sowie die daraus resultierenden Vorteile erwähnt. Wenn noch nicht einmal das kleine serbische Königreich vor großen finanziellen Opfern zurückschreckte, ja nicht einmal zögerte, als freies und unabhängiges Königreich die erste Anleihe für die Kolonisation aufzunehmen, dann sollte doch wohl unser heutiges Jugoslawien in der Lage sein, entsprechendes zu unternehmen! Es kann und muß etwas unternehmen; im übrigen ist es nicht wahr, daß es keine Mittel gibt. Berechnen wir annähernd, was würde die Umsiedlung von 200 000 Albanern und die Niederlassung der gleichen Anzahl unserer Kolonisten den Staat kosten.
    Die Umsiedlung von 40 000 albanischen Familien, dabei gehen wir von durchschnittlich fünf Familienmitgliedern aus, würde sich bei einem Kostenaufwand von 15 000 Dinar pro Familie auf höchstens 600 000 000 Dinar belaufen. Die Kolonisationskosten für die Niederlassung unserer 40 000 Familien würden sich auf höchstens 200 000 000 Dinar belaufen. Um diese Dinge zu erledigen, würde man nicht mehr als 800 000 000 Dinar verausgaben. Hier die Gründe:

    1. Die umgesiedelten Albaner werden nicht nur den Boden, sondern auch das Haus und die Arbeitsgeräte zurücklassen. Auf diese Weise wird der größte Teil unserer Kolonisten nicht nur die Häuser der Albaner beziehen, sondern wird sich auch durch eine kleine Vieh- und Nahrungsmittelhilfe wirtschaftlich sanieren und somit unabhängig. Darum heben wir an dieser Stelle hervor, daß man keineswegs zulassen darf, daß mit dem von den Albanern hinterlassenen Eigentum Privatspekulation betrieben wird; hier muß der Staat zugreifen und es dann den Kolonisten übergeben
    2. Während der Gründung der neuen Kolonien muß man dort, wo es notwendig erscheint, Militärkräfte einsetzen, wie beim Aufbau von Sremska Rac und beim Wiederaufbau der vom Erdbeben 1931 zerstörten Häuser im Süden. Dafür sollte man der Armee das Recht und die Möglichkeit verschaffen, durch Einberufung von Reservisten für militärische Übung bzw. durch Verlängerung der Militärdienstzeit eine Art von Zwangsarbeitsdienst für öffentliche Objekte zu schaffen wie Stambolisky in Bulgarien die "Trudova Povinost" und Hitler in Deutschland den "Arbeitsdienst". Es wäre besonders gut, unserer gebildete Jugend nach dem Hochschulabschluß diese Aufgaben anzuvertrauen; denn wenn sie sich mit einer Aufbauarbeit im allgemeinen Interesse beschäftigt, würden viele Jugendliche die Dinge bewußter und realistischer betrachten. Das wäre am leichtesten zu bewerkstelligen, wenn man jene Jugendliche vorzugsweise in den Staatsdienst aufnehmen würde, die sich für eine gewisse Zeit mit den Angelegenheiten unserer Kolonisation befaßt haben. Damit könnte man auch die Arbeitslosigkeit unserer jungen Intelligenz, die bei uns immer mehr ein schwieriges gesellschaftliches Problem wird, einschränken.
    3. In Vereinbarung mit den spezialisierten Organisationen und Gesellschaften sollte man weniger kostspielige Werke zur Urbarmachung der Böden, zur Bewässerung und zur Trockenlegung der Sümpfe usw. sowie zum Wohnungsbau finden. Man sollte die Privatunternehmen darüber in Kenntnis setzen, daß der Staat sie während der Beschaffung des erforderlichen Materials mit Eisenbahntarifen, Zollgebühren, Krediten und anderen Mitteln schützt, daß er aber auch das Recht hat, von ihnen zu verlangen, für eine so wichtige Arbeit Material mit möglichst kleiner Profitspanne auszugeben. Die Frage der Materialbeschaffung muß direkt durch Kartelle gelöst werden. Der Staat wird danach in Vereinbarungen mit diesen Betrieben sowohl die Quantität als auch die Qualität und den Preis der festgelegten Materialien bestimmen. Die staatlichen Unternehmen, das Eisenbahnnetz und insbesondere die Forstbetriebe wie Sipad usw. müssen vollständig zur Verfügung des Staatsrats für Kolonisation stehen.
    4. Während der Kolonisation kann der Staat den Kolonisten Eigentum mit Krediten bzw. mit Bargeld verschaffen. Es wird viele von denjenigen geben, die Grundstücke in neuen Gegenden kaufen werden, nachdem sie ihr Eigentum im Geburtsland veräußert haben. Eigentlich würde sogar diese geringe Kolonisation mehr Schaden als Nutzen bringen. Wenn man Kolonisten herunterschicken sollte, südlich von Crna Gora bei Skopje, sollte man Vranjaner, Leskovcaner nehmen, die den Mazedoniern, was Mentalität und Kultur anbelangt, näher stehen. Auf keinen Fall aber sollte man Dinariker mit ihrem zügellosen und unangenehmen Temperament nehmen, weil bei den Einwohnern mit solchem Element Abscheu verursacht wird. Wir bekräftigen, daß dieses Problem erst dann gelöst werden kann, wenn sich unsere Kolonisten aus dem Norden, durch Kosovo und Metohija Richtung Sar Planina und Pologgebirge vordringend, mit den von Mazedoniern bewohnten Gebieten vereinigen.

    Das Problem der Verwaltungseinheit Novi Pazar löst sich gerade von selbst und spielt längst nicht mehr jene Rolle im unseren staatlichen Leben, die es bis 1912 gespielt hat. Wir sollten nur erwähnen, daß mit der Vertreibung der Albaner die letzten Verbindungen unserer Mohammedaner in Bosnien und Novi Pazar mit der alten islamischen Welt unterbrochen werden würden. Sie sind im Begriff, zur religiösen Minderheit zu werden, zur einzigen Minderheit auf dem Balkan; dieses Faktum wird ihre Nationalisierung beschleunigen.
    In der letzten Zeit wurde Montenegro zu einem überaus schwerwiegenden Problem. Das verarmte Gebiet ist noch nicht einmal in der Lage, die eigene Bevölkerung zu ernähren; trotz Umsiedlung wuchs die Bevölkerung von 1912 bis 1931 um 16 Prozent. Dieses unruhige Hirtenelement ist unserer Rasse in den Jahrhunderten in Fleisch und Blut übergegangen. Ihre ausreichend kompensierten Energien werden nicht destruktiv sein, sondern können zum allgemeinen Vorteil des Staates genutzt werden, sollten sie in südöstliche Richtung geleitet werden.
    Zusammenfassung
    Es ist unmöglich, die Albaner lediglich durch schrittweise Kolonisation zurückzuschlagen; es ist das einzige Volk, dem es nicht nur gelang, während des letzten Jahrtausends im Kern unseres Staates, Raska und Zeta, zu überleben; es brachte uns vielmehr auch Schaden, indem es unsere ethnischen Grenzen nach Norden und Osten verschob. Während sich unsere ethnischen Grenzen im letzten Jahrtausend im Norden bis Subotica, im Nordwesten bis zur Kupa ausgedehnt hatten, verdrängten uns die Albaner aus dem Gebiet von Shkodra, der ehemaligen Hauptstadt von Budinov, sowie aus Metohija und Kosovo. Die einzige Möglichkeit und das einzige Mittel ist die brutale Gewalt einer durchorganisierten Staatsmacht, worin wir ihnen immer schon überlegen waren. Daran, daß wir seit 1912 und danach keine Erfolge im Kampf gegen sie hatten, sind wir selbst Schuld, weil wir diese Macht nicht wie erforderlich eingesetzt haben. Von ihrer nationalen Assimilierung zu unseren Gunsten kann überhaupt keine Rede sein. Im Gegenteil, aufgrund dessen, daß man sich auf einen guten Teil der Gelder zurückbekommen. Wir möchten betonen, daß der Boden nur an den verkauft werden kann, der den Beweis erbringt, sich endgültig niederzulassen und den Boden zu bearbeiten. Der auf Kredit überlassene Boden darf nicht übermäßig teuer sein, die Raten müssen minimal sein; die Frist der Rückzahlung soll einige Jahre nach Niederlassung des Kolonisten, daß heißt, nachdem er sich wirtschaftlich konsolidiert hat, beginnen.
    Das als Grundlage betrachtend, kann der Staat Mittel aus zwei Quellen rekrutieren: Sämtliche Verwaltungskosten muß der Staat übernehmen und sie durch sein gewöhnliches Einkommen decken; das erreicht er dadurch, daß er unnötige und im Augenblick nicht so wichtige Ausgaben aus anderen Bereichen kürzt. Die andere finanzielle Quelle kann die Anleihe sein, die die Staatsbanken allein oder gemeinsam mit unserem Privatkapital in Form von inneren Zwangsanleihen gewähren werden. Als Grundlage dafür werden die vom Staat ausgegebenen Obligationen sowie Steuern der Kolonisten, wenn sie unabhängig werden, dienen.
    Es wäre nicht schlecht, die Finanzierung und den Ankauf der Grundstücke über die Agrarbanken in Zusammenarbeit mit den genossenschaftlichen Vereinigungen unter der unmittelbaren Kontrolle und auf Grundlage der Direktiven des Staatsrates für Kolonisation laufen zu lassen. Doch ist es noch zu früh, zu dieser Frage festgelegte Meinungen zu äußern, denn bisher ist noch unklar, unter welchen Bedingungen die Türkei unsere Umsiedler aufnehmen wird.
    Im Vergleich mit den Gewinnen, die der Staat durch diesen Prozeß in Wirklichkeit einstreichen wird, ist die Summe von einigen hundert Millionen Dinar zusammengenommen eine recht kleine Ausgabe für den Staat. Die Absicherung unseres neuralgischen Punktes im Süden durch unser nationales Element erspart uns im Falle eines Krieges einige Divisionen. Indem zigtausende Familien aus unseren passiven Gebieten, insbesondere aus Montenegro, als Kolonisten angesiedelt werden, wird die unerträgliche Wirtschaftskrise in diesen Gegenden erleichtert; zum anderen wird als Ergebnis der großen Arbeit während der Kolonisation möglich gemacht, zehntausend Arbeiter zu beschäftigen; so wird auch unserer trägen Wirtschaft ein Anstoß gegeben.
    Dafür ist es die Aufgabe unseres Staates, für eine solche nationale, strategisch- militärische und wirtschaftliche Aufgabe einige Hundert Millionen Dinar zu opfern. Zu einer Zeit, da der Staat in der Lage ist, Milliarden Dinar für den Bau der internationalen Autobahn Subotica-Carigrad zu verausgaben, von dem reale Profite erst in ferner Zukunft herauszuschlagen sind, kann und muß er um so mehr einige Hundert Millionen Dinar aufbringen, die ihm die Wiege unseres Staates ins Eigentum zurückführen würden.
    Schlußfolgerung
    Alles oben gesagte vor Augen haltend, ist es kein Zufall, daß wir während der Erörterung der Kolonisationsfrage im Süden im Standpunkt ausgehen, daß die einzig wirkungsvolle Lösungsart dieses Problems die massenhafte Vertreibung der Albaner ist. Die allmähliche Kolonisation hat genauso wie in anderen Ländern auch bei uns keinen Erfolg gehabt. Wenn die Staatsmacht sich im Interesse der eigenen Elemente in den Kampf um Boden einzumischen wünscht, kann sie nur dann Erfolg: haben, wenn sie brutal vorgeht. Andernfalls sind die in ihren Geburtsländern verwurzelten und akklimatisierten Einwohner immer stärker als die Kolonisten. In unserem Fall müssen wir uns unbedingt vor Augen halten, daß wir es mit einer grobschlächtigen widerstandsfähigen und gebärfreudigen Rassen zu tun haben, über die der verstorbene Cvijic gesagt hat, sie sei die expansivste auf dem Balkan. Von 1870 bis 1914 hat Deutschland etliche Milliarden Mark ausgegeben, um seine Ostgebiete zu kolonisieren, wobei es den Polen den Boden .schrittweise abgekauft hat. Doch die Fruchtbarkeit der polnischen Mütter bezwang die deutsche Organisation und das deutsche Geld. Auf diese Weise erhielt Polen Poznan 1918 wieder zurück. Unsere Statistiken von 1921 bis 1931, die wir erwähnt haben, zeigen, daß die Fruchtbarkeit der albanischen Frauen auch unsere Kolonisationspolitik zunichte gemacht hat. Daraus müssen wir Schlußfolgerungen ziehen und uns beeilen, Korrekturen vorzunehmen, solange wir noch Zeit haben. Ganz Europa befindet sich in einer brenzligen Lage. Wir wissen nicht, was uns der morgige Tag bringen wird. Der albanische Nationalismus wächst auch in unseren Gegenden. Die Lage so zu lassen, wie sie ist, würde bedeuten, im Falle eines Weltkonflikts oder einer sozialen Revolution, nah und möglich ist das eine wie das andere, unseren gesamten Boden im Süden in Frage zu stellen. Das Ziel dieses Referats besteht darin, das zu vermeiden.
    Dr. V. Cubrilovic

  4. #104
    Avatar von Mbreti Bardhyl

    Registriert seit
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    Möge die Diskussion beginnen!!!!

  5. #105
    Avatar von Furyc

    Registriert seit
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    Wehe, es meldet sich hier jemand, der behauptet diese Texte da oben komplett durchgelesen zu haben!

  6. #106
    Avatar von Mbreti Bardhyl

    Registriert seit
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    Zitat Zitat von Fury Beitrag anzeigen
    Wehe, es meldet sich hier jemand, der behauptet diese Texte da oben komplett durchgelesen zu haben!
    Und zwar deutsch un Englisch
    Ich habe seit 5 jahren in mein computer geschpeichert.
    Schon paar mal gelesen Furylein.
    Ist das ihre antwort????

  7. #107
    Avatar von specialForces

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    Ich will noch das serbische Original.

  8. #108
    Avatar von Furyc

    Registriert seit
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    Zitat Zitat von Mbreti Bardhyl Beitrag anzeigen
    Und zwar deutsch un Englisch
    Ich habe seit 5 jahren in mein computer geschpeichert.
    Schon paar mal gelesen Furylein.
    Ist das ihre antwort????

    Junge, ich bin über 30 und hochschwanger. Da brauch ich für so Texte locker ne Woche, also HETZ MICH NICHT!

  9. #109
    Avatar von Mbreti Bardhyl

    Registriert seit
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    Zitat Zitat von Fury Beitrag anzeigen
    Junge, ich bin über 30 und hochschwanger. Da brauch ich für so Texte locker ne Woche, also HETZ MICH NICHT!
    Hahhahahaha ok Fury.
    Ich wünsche ihnen Angenehme Schwangerschaft

  10. #110
    Avatar von skenderbegi

    Registriert seit
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    die systematische unterdrückung der albaner durch die serben fakten


    »Die heutige Welt hat sich an weit schlimmeres als das gewöhnt und ist so mit alltäglichen Problemen beschäftigt, daß man sich darüber nicht zu sorgen braucht. Wenn Deutschland Zehntausende Juden ausweisen kann und Rußland Millionen von Menschen von einem Teil des Kontinents zum anderen verpflanzen kann, dann wird die Verlagerung von einigen hunderttausend Albanern nicht zum Ausbruch eines neuen Weltkriegs führen.«[23]

    Das Jahrhundert der "ethnischen Saeuberungen" II

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