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EU Balkan Kommission stellt Scheitern im Kosovo fest

Erstellt von lupo-de-mare, 16.04.2005, 07:26 Uhr · 1 Antwort · 490 Aufrufe

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    Avatar von lupo-de-mare

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    EU Balkan Kommission stellt Scheitern im Kosovo fest

    Die UNMIK, NATO und die Westlichen Politiker sind mit ihrer "Politik" im Kosovo gescheitert, stellt die zuständige EU Kommision in einem Report fest.

    In absolut allen Punkten, wie Sicherheit, Arbeit, Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ist der Kosovo gescheitert u.a. weil die UCK Verbrecher eine nicht funktionierende Bürokratie mit Hilfe der UNMIK dort aufgebaut haben. Dort arbeiten unqualifizierte Leute, welche nur ihre Clan Mitglieder versorgen.

    Das Scheitern, der Kosovo Mission ist eine grosse Schande für die Westliche Gemeinschaft. Im UN Report von Karl Eibe, wird ebenso ausdrücklich auf die Fehler der UN hingewiesen und das solche Fehler nicht toleriert werden können und dürfen.

    Ebenso wird die Belgrader Führung für die Umstände mit verantwortlich gemacht, für die Notlage der Serben.

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    Am 17. März 2004 verbogen sich die nicht stabilen Fundamente von viereinhalb Jahren des allmählichen Fortschritts in Kosovo und gaben nach. Innerhalb Stunden wurde die Provinz in antiserbisch und die Unruhen von antivereinten Nationen versenkt und hatte regressed zu Niveaus der seit 1999 nicht gesehenen Gewalt. Vor dem 18. März änderte sich die Gewalt in die ethnische Säuberung von kompletten Minderheitsdörfern und Nachbarschaft. Die Mengen von albanischen Jugendlichen, Extremisten und Verbrechern stellten die Mission von Vereinten Nationen in Kosovo (UNMIK) und die NATO-GEFÜHRTE Friedenskraft (KFOR) als sehr schwach aus. Kosovos provisorische Einrichtungen der Selbstverwaltung (PISG), Medien und Zivilgesellschaft gewährten die Aufrührer-Lizenz für die Körperverletzung. Die internationale Gemeinschaft braucht dringend neue Policen - auf dem Endstatus und sozioökonomischer Entwicklung gleich - oder Kosovar Instabilität kann das komplette Gebiet anstecken.

    http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2627&l=1

    Übersetzung des Anfanges:

    Der Balkan in Europas Zukünftigem Bericht der Internationalen Kommission auf dem Balkan 1.3.1. Kosovos Endstatus-Zeit läuft in Kosovo ab. Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat in seinen Versuchen deutlich versagt, Sicherheit und Entwicklung zur Provinz zu bringen. Ein multiethnisches Kosovo besteht außer in den bürokratischen Bewertungen der internationalen Gemeinschaft nicht. Die Ereignisse des Märzes 2004 beliefen sich auf das stärkste Signal noch, dass die Situation explodieren konnte. Seitdem hat UNMIK weder die Kapazität noch den Mut demonstriert, diese Tendenz umzukehren. Serben in Kosovo leben eingesperrt in ihren Enklaven ohne Freizügigkeit, keine Jobs, und weder mit Hoffnung noch mit Gelegenheit für die bedeutungsvolle Integration in die Kosovar Gesellschaft. Die Position der serbischen Minderheit in Kosovo ist die größte Anklage von Europas Bereitwilligkeit und Fähigkeit, seine öffentlich verkündigten Werte zu verteidigen. Kosovar Albaner sollten eine klare Nachricht erhalten, dass der Gebrauch der Gewalt der schlechteste Feind ihres Traums für die Unabhängigkeit ist. Der Mangel an der Führung in Belgrad hat zur Notlage der Kosovar Serben beigetragen, und die serbische Gemeinschaft in Kosovo ist in großem Maße Geisel für die politischen Kämpfe in der serbischen Hauptstadt geworden.Die albanische Führung in Kosovo muss auch seinen Teil der Schuld schultern, um zu scheitern, jede echte Bereitwilligkeit zu zeigen, sich mit einem Prozess der Versöhnung und zu beschäftigen. Über die letzten paar Jahre hat UNMIK bei mehreren Gelegenheiten gewesen aktiv eingeschlossen an einer Politik des Rückurteilsvermögens in Kosovo. Unter der Führung von UNMIK die Zahl von Serben verwendet in Kosovo hat sich Elektrische Gesellschaft von mehr als 4000 1999 bis 29 jetzt aus der Summe von mehr als 8000 Angestellten geneigt. "


    ttp://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf

    The Balkans in Europe's Future Report of the International Commission on the Balkans

    1.3.1. Kosovo's Final Status

    Time is running out in Kosovo. The international community has clearly failed in its attempts to bring security and development to the province. A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist except in the bureaucratic assessments of the international community. The events of March 2004 amounted to the strongest signal yet that the situation could explode. Since then UNMIK has demonstrated neither the capacity nor the courage to reverse this trend. Serbs in Kosovo are living imprisoned in their enclaves with no freedom of movement, no jobs, and with neither hope nor opportunity for meaningful integration into Kosovo society. The position of the Serbian minority in Kosovo is the greatest indictment of Europe's willingness and ability to defend its proclaimed values. Kosovo Albanians should receive a clear message that the use of violence is the worst enemy of their dream for independence. The lack of leadership in Belgrade has contributed to the plight of the Kosovo Serbs, and the Serbian community in Kosovo has to a large degree become hostage to the political struggles in the Serbian capital. The Albanian leadership in Kosovo must also shoulder its part of the blame for failing to show any real willingness to engage in a process of reconciliation and the development of multi-ethnic institutions and structures. Our survey indicates that a majority of Kosovars is keen on living in an "ethnically homogeneous Kosovo" (figure 22). Most Kosovo Albanian politicians have done nothing to oppose this public mood which flies in the face of everything that Europe believes in. But a substantial share of the blame for the failure of the project of a multiethnic society in Kosovo should be placed at the door of UNMIK and the international community. Over the past few years UNMIK has on several occasions been actively involved in a policy of reverse discrimination in Kosovo. Under UNMIK's leadership the number of Serbs employed in the Kosovo Electric Company has declined from more than 4000 in 1999 to 29 now, out of total of over 8000 employees. "The international community in Kosovo is today seen by Kosovo Albanians as having gone from opening the way to now standing in the way. It is seen by Kosovo Serbs as having gone from securing the return of so many to being unable to ensure the return of so few." [Kai Eide, The Situation in Kosovo. Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Brussels, 15 July, 2004.] The failure of UNMIK can be explained but it should not be tolerated. The social and economic situation in the protectorate is no less depress- ing. Kosovo suffers endless disruption thanks to its regular power cuts. Some villages in the provinces are without electricity for periods of longer than a month. The province never boasted a self-sustaining economy and there is no chance that it will develop one now. Currently, the unemployment rate is about 60 to 70% (almost 90% among minorities). The construction boom of the immediate post-war period has come to an end. Kosovo Albanians are frustrated with their unresolved status, with the economic situation, and with the problems of dealing with the past. The demand for sovereignty has not diminished; on the contrary, it has increased in the past year. UNMIK is perceived by the local public as corrupt and indecisive. The Commission shares the judgment of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that Kosovo has made insufficient progress towards meeting internationally agreed standards with regard to human rights, respect for minorities, and law and order. At the same time the Commission wishes to underscore the urgency of dealing with the final status of Kosovo. We do not believe that Kosovo's independence will solve all the territory's problems, but we are concerned that postponing the status talks will lead to a further deterioration in the situation in the province. In our view Kosovo's independence should not be imposed on Belgrade. The 'imposition' of Kosovo's independence is not only undesirable, it is also unlikely to happen, bearing in mind that some members of the UN Security Council (Russia, China) are opposed to it. Moreover, if Belgrade opposes the process, it will significantly increase the chances of trouble breaking out elsewhere whether in Bosnia, Macedonia or Montenegro. The Commission is also pessimistic about the possibility of direct talks alone between Belgrade and Pristina when it comes to solving the status issue. It is up to the international community to guide this process. In our view, negotiations on the status of Kosovo should concentrate on offering real incentives to Belgrade so that Serbia may find acceptable the prospect of an independent Kosovo as a future member of the EU. Persuading Belgrade to engage is difficult but not impossible. If anything can, the EU accession process can provide such incentives. Within this context, Kosovo's independence should be achieved in four stages.

    The first stage would see the de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia. In our view this stage is implicit in Resolution 1244, which trans- formed Kosovo into a UN protectorate. This is despite the fact that the UNSCR 1244 deals with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and not with Serbia. It is a dangerous illusion that Kosovo can revert to rule from Belgrade in any foreseeable future.

    The second stage (independence without full sovereignty) should recognise in 2005/2006 Kosovo as an independent entity but one where the international community reserves its powers in the fields of human rights and the protection of minorities. Legally Kosovo will remain a UN protectorate but the Commission advocates transferring the UN's authority, as defined by Chapter 7, from UNMIK to the EU. KFOR should preserve both its mandate and its size. Kosovo should be treated as independent but not as a sovereign state at this stage, allowing it to develop a capacity for self-government. All functions of a normal government that are currently performed by UNMIK or KFOR should be transferred to the government of Kosovo. This government will tax and police the population, regulate the economy and provide public services. The international community should reserve its power to intervene in those areas that are essential for meeting the Copenhagen criteria, namely human rights and minority protection. In order for this policy to work, we should move away from a 'standards before status' policy and towards a 'standards and status' policy. Decentralisation, the return of refugees, and the clarification of property rights are the key questions to be addressed. At this stage the Commission advocates a special arrangement for the area around Mitrovica and a special legal status for the Serbian monasteries. A special administrative arrangement for Mitrovica (a transitional international administration along the lines of UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia) should exclude the possibility of Kosovo's partition. The Commission advocates an internationally-supervised census in Kosovo, including of those who claim to hail from Kosovo, before we can start designing a programme of decentralisation. The definition of a 'Kosovo citizen' is of critical importance. The long-overdue census should be complemented by clearing up the property claims in the province. Disputed property rights are the major obstacle to economic development in the region. This is true for both private property and for the 'social property' from the Yugoslav period. The returns policy introduced by the international community in Kosovo should be modelled on the successful returns policy applied in Bosnia. In our view, the implementation of the returns policy is of great impor tance. But our conversations with both Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia convinced us that the chances for a large-scale return are minimal. The international community should provide incentives for Kosovo Serbs to return even if they prefer to live in the mostly Serb-populated parts of the province and not in areas where they lived before the war. It should also take care of those who decide not to go back. A 'Palestinisation' of the refugees who decide not to return to Kosovo could be a major source of vulnerability for Serbia's democracy. This is why the Commission supports the establishment of an 'Inclusion Fund' to assist the integration in Serbian society of the Kosovo Serbs who have chosen to remain in Serbia. This fund should be financed by the European Union. The decentralisation of power in Kosovo and guarantees of a normal life for Kosovo Serbs are a pre-condition for engaging Belgrade in a constructive debate with respect to Kosovo's independence. In the view of the Commission, some of the minority quotas provided for the Albanians in Macedonia in the Ohrid Agreement should also be given to the Serbs of Kosovo. Decentralisation should afford Serbian enclaves a real opportunity for self-government and development. It is essential to appreciate how Serbs believe that the social and economic difficulties they have experienced over the past five years amount to an intentional policy of discrimination and ethnic cleansing, designed by Albanians and underwritten by the international community. So, the European Union should develop special incentives for companies that employ citizens from ethnic minorities. The need for policies focused on the needs of minorities should not obscure that the culture of civil society, and not the principle of ethnic separation, is at the heart of the European project. The 'ghettoisation' of ethnic minorities could promote institutional weakness and dysfunctionality in the future state. The US's active engagement at this second stage is of critical importance for a successful outcome of the EU negotiating process. Kosovo Albanians view the US as a guarantor of their independence and an American disengagement or a split in the Euro-Atlantic community could quickly lead to trouble.

    The third stage (guided sovereignty) would coincide with Kosovo's recognition as a candidate for EU membership and the opening of negotiations with Brussels. There is a real purpose to this stage as the EU cannot negotiate with itself (i.e. with a protectorate which it controls). During this stage the EU would lose its reserved powers in the fields of human rights and minority protection and would exercise influence through the negotiation process alone.

    The fourth stage (full and shared sovereignty) will mark the absorption of Kosovo into the EU and its adoption of the shared sovereignty to which all EU member states are subject.

    These stages would be an integral part of the overall process of Europe integration of the Balkans as suggested earlier. The necessary precondition for both the Serbian government and the Serbian public is a fast track accession of Serbia to the EU together with international guarantees for the protection of the interests of Kosovo Serbs. Croatia provides a precedent in terms of such a fast-track approach. In our opinion, the fast track for Serbia is a sine qua non. The EU accession process is the only framework that gives Serbia real incentives if not to endorse then at least to consent to such a fundamental change in the status of Kosovo as independence represents.

    .

    III. CONCLUSIONS

    The Commission is convinced that current status quo in the Balkans has outlived its usefulness. There is an urgent need to solve the extant status and constitutional issues in the Balkans and to move the region as a whole from the stage of protectorates and weak states to the stage of EU accession. The Commission advocates the convening of an EU-Balkans Summit in the autumn of 2006. The Summit should present a 'Balkan audit' to demonstrate how much money EU countries are spending on the Balkans. It should put forward a consolidated 'Balkan Budget' that should in the future become an integral part of the Financial Perspectives of the Union. The EU would only convene the Summit after a resolution of all the status and constitutional issues that are currently open. At this Summit each Balkan country will receive its EU road map. In the case of Kosovo, the Commission suggests a four-stage transition in the evolution of Kosovo's sovereignty. This should evolve from the status quo as set out in Resolution 1244 to "independence without full sovereignty" with reserved powers for the international community in the fields of human rights and minority protection; onto "guided sovereignty" that Kosovo will enjoy while negotiating with EU; before finally arriving at "shared sovereignty" inside the EU. In the view of the Commission, the powers of UNMIK should be transferred to the EU. In the case of Bosnia, after ten years since the Dayton Accords, the Commission envisions passing from the Office of High Representative to an EU Accession Negotiator. This implies moving Bosnia from "Bonn to Brussels" whereby the EU Negotiator will replace the OHR. Bosnia should join PfP as soon as possible. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the Commission judges the current Federation of Serbia and Montenegro to be non-functional. The citizens of Serbia and Montenegro should decide by the autumn of the year 2006 whether to opt for a functional federation or functional separation. In the view of the Commission, the democratic future of Serbia is key to the progress in the region. The Commission therefore advocates that Serbia and Montenegro be extended an invitation to PfP immediately and that Serbia and Montenegro as one or as two countries should start negotiations or be offered a Europe Agreement at the Balkan Summit in the autumn of 2006. The Commission regards the success of the Ohrid process in Macedonia as a model for other parts of the Balkans. Furthermore, it urges the European Commission to use the suggested Balkan Summit of the EU to start accession talks with Macedonia by the autumn of 2006 at the latest. In the summer of 2006, Macedonia should receive an invitation to join NATO. In the view of the International Commission on the Balkans, the dispute over the name of the Republic of Macedonia and the demarcation of the border with Kosovo are sources of potential instability in the republic. The international community should concentrate on resolving these two issues. The Commission regards the decision of the EU to start negotiations with Croatia and the prospect of Croatian membership as central to the integration of the region as a whole into the EU. The Commission also envisions Croatia being invited to join NATO in the summer of 2006. The Commission highly estimates Albania's contribution to the general stability of the region and thinks that Albania should be invited to join NATO in the summer of 2006 and be offered negotiations or a Europe Agreement by the autumn of that year thereby triggering the process of member-state building in the country. The Commission urges the US government to play a more active role in the region. What the Balkans need most is Washington's political attention to the problems of the region. The Commission is convinced that only co-ordinated EU-US policies can help the region to get on, get in and catch up with the rest of Europe. In the spirit of supporting the European generation of the Balkans, our Commission suggests that member states establish a Balkan Student Visa Programme for 150,000 full-time students in Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania by June 2005. After the success in drawing Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Croatia into the European Union, the logic for a further enlargement is compelling: without the Balkans in the EU, the process of unification will remain incomplete. Alternatively, the EU runs a serious risk of allowing a black hole to emerge on the European periphery that could inflict considerable harm on the European project. 2014 is the year and Sarajevo is the place where the European Union can proudly announce the arrival of the European century.

    Mit Verbrechern und den Terroristen der UCK KLA, kann man keinen Staat aufbauen, was absolut von Beginn an klar war. Das war die Idee von dummen und kriminellen Westlichen Politikern, durch Terror und Mord den Kosovo Krieg zu provozieren und zu inzenieren. Und mit den Lügen von Joschka Fischer, Scharping, Naumann und Co. kann man den für die Albaner Mafia inzenierten Krieg, ebenso wenig verkaufen.


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    Harte Kritik der Balkan Commision gegen die EU und UN im Balkan, wegen der vollkommen verfehlten und falschen POlitik.

    ttp://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/04/28/news/bal kans.php

    EU and UN criticized for their Balkan policies

    By Judy Dempsey International Herald Tribune FRIDAY, APRIL 29, 2005

    BERLIN The high-powered International Commission on the Balkans has issued a scathing critique of EU and UN policies in the Balkans, accusing both organizations of hindering democratic growth and warning that bleak economic and political conditions may lead to renewed instability. "The red lights could soon start blinking if we don't take stock of the reality on the ground," said Alex Rondos, former Greek ambassador at large and member of the commission. "The region is not as stable as the EU makes out." The commission asserts that democracy has been stifled in Bosnia "by the coercive authority" of Paddy Ashdown, the EU's high representative. The international representatives, the commission says, "dabble in social engineering but are not held accountable when their policies go wrong. If Europe's neocolonial rule becomes further entrenched, it will encourage economic discontent and European electorates would see it as an immense and unnecessary financial and moral burden." The commission challenged the European Union to offer Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia and the province of Kosovo a formal timetable for admission to the Union, warning that failure to do so could push the Balkans into another period of instability. The recommendations by the independent commission, made public in Europe's main capitals over the past few days, propose that in late 2006 the EU sponsor a summit meeting "that aims to present all Balkan countries with their accession road maps." Once the countries have met the EU's criteria on respect for human and ethnic rights, implementation of the rule of law and the introduction of a functioning market economy, the commission says, these countries could start accession negotiations in about 2009 or 2010 and be ready to join by 2014 or 2015. The commission's main argument is that the EU and United Nations, two of the biggest international players in the Balkans, must start devising a long-term strategy to move beyond the 1996 Dayton accords, which stopped the five years of brutal civil and ethnic wars between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. It says Dayton, brokered by the United States, is inappropriate for tackling unemployment, building strong state institutions, reviving political life and getting rid of a culture of dependence created by largely unaccountable international protectorates in Kosovo and Bosnia. "The Balkans need a new strategy if it is to translate Brussels' stated political aim to integrate the region into reality," says the 64-page report. "The commission acknowledges there are no quick and easy solutions for the Balkans and that ultimately it is up to the people of the region to win their own future. But we are convinced that the international community and the European Union in particular have a historical responsibility to face and a decisive role to play in winning the future of the region." The commission - which includes Richard von Weizsäcker, a former German president; Giuliano Amato, a former Italian prime minister; and Kiro Gligorov, a former Macedonian president - pulls no punches in criticizing the performances of the UN and the EU in Kosovo and Bosnia. In Kosovo, where the NATO military alliance intervened in 1999 to stop the ethnic cleansing carried out against ethnic Albanians by President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, the commission says the international community "has clearly failed in its attempts to bring security and development to the province." It says that the UN mission in Kosovo, the protectorate that is supported by the EU and is known as Unmik, has failed to give the Serb minority any stake in the province. "Serbs in Kosovo are living imprisoned in their enclaves with no freedom of movement, no jobs, no opportunity for meaningful integration into Kosovo society."

    Copyright © 2005 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com

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